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I. INTRODUCTION
The Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku (the Sarayaku People) are an 
indigenous community in the central Amazon in Ecuador that successfully 
opposed the continued implementation of an oil concession agreement 
between their government and an Argentinian oil company, Compañía 
General de Combustibles SA (CGC).1 The story of the Sarayaku people 
is characteristic of the challenges posed by economic globalization, as 
investors increasingly enter into remote areas to execute projects that 
intrude upon the lives of the communities inhabiting these regions.
Notwithstanding its successful outcome, the story is not all rosy. 
Tensions regularly escalated and violence was never far away. The 
Sarayaku People had to fight to maintain unity, as some members  preferred 
to join forces with CGC, which successfully concluded  agreements with 
other indigenous communities in the central Amazon.
Two years after the formal suspension of the oil concession, the 
Sarayaku people also enjoyed a court victory, as the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights (the Inter-American Court or the Court) held 
that the State of Ecuador had violated their rights as an indigenous 
* This research has been funded by the Interuniversity Attraction Poles 
Programme initiated by the Belgian Science Policy Office, more specifically the 
IAP “The Global Challenge of Human Rights Integration: Towards a Users’ 
Perspective” www.hrintegration.be.
1 CGC is an Argentinian oil and gas company, which also operates in 
Venezuela, and formed a consortium with Petrolera Argentina San Jorge S.A. for 
the Ecuadorian oil concession.
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 community.2 Notwithstanding some remarkable features, the judgment 
could be improved in several respects by further integrating international 
human rights law, domestic best practices on fundamental rights and 
international environmental law.
II.  THE KICHWA INDIGENOUS PEOPLE OF 
SARAYAKU V ECUADOR
A. Relevant Facts and Arguments
The Sarayaku community comprises of around 1,200 people, who live 
along the banks of the Bobonaza River in the central Amazon, an area 
of astonishing biological diversity. Their territorial rights have been 
 recognized by the State of Ecuador since 1992. Nevertheless, when in 
1996 the government signed an oil concession agreement with CGC 
that covered the Sarayaku traditional territory, the community was not 
consulted.
When CGC approached the Sarayaku People in order to gain  peaceful 
access to their territory, they refused. The oil company nonetheless 
entered the Sarayaku territory and started carrying out its exploration 
 activities, which included the opening of seismic lines and the installation 
of large amounts of ‘pentolite’ explosives on the surface and in the subsoil. 
Moreover, the company established heliports, cut down valuable trees and 
plants, destroyed water sources and destroyed sites of great importance 
to the culture and worldview of the Sarayaku People. At times, the state 
guaranteed the security of the exploration activities with armed forces.
Because of the continued opposition by the Sarayaku People, the 
Ecuadorian government eventually suspended the oil concession in 2010, 
two years before the Inter-American Court delivered its judgment. Again 
without involving the Sarayaku People, the government and CGC agreed 
in a Deed of Termination that no environmental liability could be 
 attributed to the contractor.
In its submissions to the Court, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (the Inter-American Commission or the Commission) 
alleged that the State of Ecuador had violated the Sarayaku People’s right 
to property (article 21 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)), 
in relation to the obligations to respect rights and to adopt domestic legal 
2 The Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v Ecuador (2012) IACtHR C 
245.
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provisions and the rights to access to information, to freedom of move-
ment and residence and to prior consultation (articles 1(1), 2, 13, 22 and 
23 ACHR). In addition, the Commission alleged a violation of the rights 
to life, to personal integrity and to personal liberty (articles 4, 5 and 7 
ACHR) and to judicial guarantees and judicial protection (article 25 
ACHR). The Sarayaku People endorsed the Commission’s application, 
but also invoked article 26 ACHR as a basis for their right to cultural 
identity. Furthermore, according to the Sarayaku People, they should not 
merely have been consulted, but their free, prior and informed consent 
(FPIC) should have been obtained (paras 127 and 287).
B. Summary of the Judgment
Three remarkable aspects of the Sarayaku judgment should be  highlighted 
at the outset. First, at an early stage of the proceedings, the (new) 
Ecuadorian government acknowledged its international legal  responsibility 
(para 23) and admitted its failure to carry out a proper consultation (para 
189). Second, for the first time in the Court’s history a delegation of judges, 
accompanied by the Commission, state delegates and  representatives of 
the presumed victims, undertook a field visit to the Sarayaku territory and 
the neighbouring village of Jatún Molino. Third, the Court held that its 
legal considerations should be understood from a collective perspective, 
relating to ‘the Sarayaku People’ as such. This contrasts with previous 
jurisprudence that has only established violations of the rights of members 
of indigenous communities (para 231).
The Court began its judgment by reiterating its established principles 
on the protection of communal land and natural resources under article 
21 ACHR in relation to indigenous and tribal peoples (para 146). In 
 particular, the Court stressed that ‘one of the fundamental guarantees 
to ensure the participation of indigenous peoples . . . in their right to 
communal property, is . . . the recognition of their right to consultation’ 
(para 160), and that such consultation must meet certain quality standards 
(paras 177–178).While their communal ownership rights as such were not 
contested, the State of Ecuador had not consulted the Sarayaku People, 
who had only been approached by CGC. The obligation to consult is, 
however, a responsibility of the state that cannot be delegated (para 187). 
Moreover, the contacts between CGC and the Sarayaku People did not 
satisfy the Court’s criteria of consultation, as was strikingly illustrated 
by the non-contested allegation that CGC had used fraudulent means to 
obtain signatures from individual community members without  respecting 
established structures of authority and representation (para 194). In 
addition, the damage caused to areas of environmental, cultural and 
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subsistence food value evidenced ‘a lack of respect for their social and 
cultural identity, their customs, traditions, worldview and way of life . . .’ 
(para 220). The Court, therefore, concluded that the State of Ecuador 
had also violated the Sarayaku People’s right to cultural identity, which 
is a crosscutting means of interpretation of the ACHR in light of the 
 non-discrimination principle of article 1(1) (para 213).
The Court also found that the state had seriously jeopardized the rights 
to life and to personal integrity (para 249), because notwithstanding the 
great risks posed to the life and physical integrity of the Sarayaku People, 
the State had allowed CGC to place explosives in their territory, and had 
only partially complied with the Court’s order in the provisional measures 
to remove the explosive material.3 Finally, since the authorities had not 
adequately investigated the reported facts nor provided for an effective 
remedy to contest the oil concession, the rights to judicial guarantees 
and judicial protection had not been safeguarded either (paras 271 and 
278). As to the allegations related to freedom of movement and residence, 
 political rights, freedom of thought and expression, and economic, social 
and cultural rights, on the other hand, the Court held that the facts 
 underlying those complaints had been sufficiently examined in the context 
of its analysis under the rights to communal property, consultation, life 
and personal integrity and/or cultural rights (paras 229–230).
In line with its established jurisprudence, the Court ended its  judgment 
with the adoption of an extensive list of reparations, including  restitution 
(the removal of explosives and reforestation of the affected areas), 
 guarantees of non-repetition (due prior consultation, regulation of such 
process in domestic law and training of officials on indigenous peoples’ 
rights), satisfaction (public acknowledgment of international  responsibility 
and publication and broadcasting of the judgment) and compensation for 
both pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage.
C. Integrating Human Rights
Article 29(b) and (d) ACHR brings the Inter-American Court into pole 
position to adopt an integrative approach to human rights law.4 The 
3 See for example Order of the Court of 4 February 2010, on Provisional 
Measures regarding the Republic of Ecuador in the Matter of the Kichwa 
Indigenous People of Sarayaku.
4 Article 29. Restrictions Regarding Interpretation
No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as:
a. . . .
b. restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any right or freedom recognized by 
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Court itself has interpreted these provisions as mandating the importation 
of international and regional human rights standards, including soft law.5
The nature of the subject matter itself . . . militates against a strict distinction 
between universalism and regionalism. Mankind’s universality and the univer-
sality of the rights and freedoms which are entitled to protection form the core 
of all international protective systems. In this context, it would be improper 
to make distinctions based on the regional or non-regional character of the 
international obligations assumed by States, and thus deny the existence of the 
common core of basic human rights standards.6
This attitude is not limited to human rights law per se. Lixinski has 
convincingly argued that the Inter-American Court’s expansionism and 
activism have ensured that human rights constitute an overall part of the 
general international legal system.7 Indeed, at various points throughout 
the Sarayaku judgment, the Court draws on evolving international law 
and on domestic legal changes, for instance as regards consultation (e.g. 
paras 161–164) and the recognition of indigenous peoples as collective 
subjects of international law (para 231).
Nevertheless, this chapter argues that a more sustained integrative 
 perspective would improve the Sarayaku judgment. First of all, indigenous 
peoples’ right to self-determination should feature at the forefront of the 
Court’s analysis.8 Second, the Court should further develop the FPIC 
virtue of the laws of any State Party or by virtue of another convention to which 
one of the said states is a party;
c. . . .
d. excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have.
5 For example Moiwana Community v Suriname (2005) IACtHR C 124. 
For a discussion of the Court’s interpretative approach, see Gerald L Neuman, 
‘Import, export, and regional consent in the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights’ (2008) 19 EJIL 101.
6 ‘Other treaties’ subject to the consultative jurisdiction of the Court (Art. 64 
of the American Convention on Human Rights) (1982) IACtHR Advisory Opinion 
OC-1/82 A 1, para 40. Accord Las Palmeras v Colombia (2000) IACtHR C 67.
7 Lucas Lixinski, ‘Treaty interpretation by the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: Expansionism at the service of the unity of international law’ 
(2010) 21 EJIL 585–604.
8 For the purposes of this chapter it suffices to note that the right to self-
determination does not include a right to secede. Political self-determination 
covers self-government or autonomy at the local level and effective participation 
at the higher levels of politics. See for example CERD, General Recommendation 
21: The right to self-determination (UN Doc A/51/18 (1996)); James Anaya, ‘The 
evolution of the concept of indigenous peoples and its contemporary dimensions’ 
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norm, in line with its earlier jurisprudence. Third, the analysis of some 
possible human rights violations was in this matter unjustifiably absorbed 
into the Court’s reasoning under article 21 ACHR. Fourth, children’s 
rights could be more explicitly mainstreamed. Fifth, the right to live in 
a healthy environment should be included in the right to life. Sixth, the 
Court should explicitly acknowledge that non-state actors bear human 
rights obligations. Finally, the question arises whether the Court should 
not consider adopting an integrative approach not only to human rights 
norms, but to human rights holders as well.
III.  FEATURING INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ RIGHT 
TO SELF-DETERMINATION
In line with its established jurisprudence since the Awas Tingni case of 
2001,9 the Inter-American Court holds in the Sarayaku case that ‘Article 
21 of the American Convention protects the close relationship between 
indigenous peoples and their lands, and with the natural resources 
on their ancestral territories and the intangible elements arising from 
these’ (para 145).10 Under the Court’s construction, article 21 protects 
not only  indigenous lands and the natural resources pertaining to these 
lands,11 but also other indigenous rights, such as the rights to cultural 
identity and to freely determine and enjoy social, cultural and economic 
development.12
Nonetheless, land rights are only part of the story. According to Anaya, 
indigenous peoples’ quest for recognition finds expression in five claims: 
(1) non-discrimination, (2) cultural integrity, (3) lands and resources, (4) 
in S A Dersso (ed.), Perspectives on the Rights of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples 
in Africa (PULP 2010) 41.
 9 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v Nicaragua (2001) IACtHR C 
79, paras 148–149.
10 Article 21. Right to Property
1. Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property. The law may 
subordinate such use and enjoyment to the interest of society.
2. No one shall be deprived of his property except upon payment of just 
 compensation, for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and 
according to the forms established by law.
3. . . .
11 Saramaka People v Suriname (2007) IACtHR C 172, para 95.
12 ibid, para 122.
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social welfare and development, and (5) self-government.13 Each of these 
claims is grounded in one key principle: self-determination.14 The idea 
of self-determination is at the heart of what unifies indigenous peoples. 
Regardless of the way in which tensions emerge – forced  resettlements, 
environmental degradation, exclusion from benefits from economic 
growth or discriminatory policies – the fundamental right of which 
 indigenous peoples are deprived is their right to decide for themselves and 
to choose their own development path.
While most, but definitely the first, cases reaching the Inter-American 
Court’s docket revolve(d) around land claims,15 many complaints brought 
by indigenous communities over the years related to land rights but in 
essence also dealt with cultural identity, non-discrimination, development 
and autonomous decision-making.16 The Court nevertheless persists in 
handling such cases under the right to property – likewise in the Sarayaku 
case albeit in conjunction with the non-discrimination principle of article 
1(1) ACHR. Whilst it is true that neither the Commission nor the Sarayaku 
representatives invoked a separate violation of, for instance, their political 
rights, the principle of jura novit curia allows the Court to raise a relevant 
legal issue that was overlooked by the petitioners, the Commission and the 
state, for instance when the Court wants to extend its jurisprudence.17
According to the Court, the Sarayaku People show a special  relationship 
with their surroundings, which must be protected under article 21 ACHR 
‘to ensure that they can continue their traditional way of living . . .’ (para 
146).18 Although the Court concedes that this special relationship can 
be expressed in different ways and has to be possible, a holding like the 
one quoted may (unintentionally) create the impression that  indigenous 
 communities (should) always maintain a harmonious  relationship 
with their lands and natural resources, precisely because their way of 
 interacting with the natural environment constitutes an inherent part of 
13 James Anaya, Indigenous peoples in international law (2nd edn, Oxford 
University Press 2004) 129.
14 ibid, 129.
15 See also Thomas M Antkowiak, ‘Rights, resources, and rhetoric: 
Indigenous peoples and the Inter-American Court’ (2013–2014) 35 UPJIL 137.
16 James Anaya, ‘Indigenous peoples’ participatory rights in relation to 
decisions about natural resource extraction: The more fundamental issue of what 
rights indigenous peoples have in lands and resources’ (2005) 22 AJICL 7.
17 Dinah Shelton, ‘Jura novit curia in international human rights tribunals’ 
in Nerina Boschiero et al. (eds), International Courts and the Development of 
International Law (Springer 2012) 210; Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v 
Paraguay (2006) IACtHR C 146, para 187.
18 Emphasis added.
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their  culture.19 It may not be, however, that indigenous communities who 
oppose a project because they disagree with its conditions or because they 
want to undertake those activities themselves, no longer enjoy protection 
from the indigenous rights regime.20 The same applies to communities who 
have agreed to a project but are subsequently confronted with violations 
of their rights.
Therefore, in the rewritten judgment all references to indigenous 
 communities’ ability to continue their ‘traditional way of living’ are replaced 
by the safeguard that they can ‘choose their own development path’, 
whichever one that is (for example, para 146).21 True, there is no obvious 
provision in the ACHR in which to ground a right to  self-determination of 
indigenous peoples. In the Saramaka judgment of 2006, however, the Inter-
American Court relied on Common article 1 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) (the right to self-
determination) and on article 27 ICCPR (the minority rights provision22) to 
interpret indigenous peoples’ land rights, and to conclude that indigenous 
peoples have a right to freely determine and enjoy their own social, cultural 
and economic development.23 The Court should have reiterated and further 
developed this integrative  perspective.24 Not only indigenous peoples’ right 
to communal  ownership (article 21 ACHR), but also their rights to cultural 
19 See also Antkowiak (n 15) 160–1; Eric Dannenmaier, ‘Beyond indigenous 
property rights: Exploring the emergence of a distinctive connection doctrine’ 
(2008–2009) 86 WULR 53, 109; Cherie Metcalf, ‘Indigenous rights and the 
 environment: Evolving international law’ (2003–2004) 35 OLR 101, 105–6, 108 
and 124.
20 See, for instance, the Human Rights Committee’s holding in Länsman v 
Finland that the fact ‘that the authors may have adapted their methods of reindeer 
herding over the years and practice it with the help of modern technology does not 
prevent them from invoking article 27 of the Covenant’. Ilmari Länsman et al. v 
Finland (1994) HRC511/1992, UN Doc CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992, para 9.3; See also 
Antkowiak (n 15) 161; Robert H jr. Keller and Michael F Turek, American Indians 
and National Parks (University of Arizona Press 1999) 239.
21 This does not amount to a right to engage in environmentally destructive 
activities, however. For a discussion, see for example Ellen Desmet, Indigenous 
Rights Entwined with Nature Conservation (Intersentia 2011) 207–8.
22 This provision has been interpreted by the Human Rights Committee as 
ensuring that minorities have a right to enjoy their own culture, which may consist 
in a way of life that is closely associated with territory and use of its resources. 
HRC, ‘General Comment No 23: The right of minorities (Art. 27)’ (UN Doc 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/add.5 (1994)), para 3.2, Accord Saramaka v Suriname (n 11), 
para 94.
23 ibid, paras 93–95. 
24 see also Antkowiak (n 15) 157.
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identity (article 26 ACHR), to equality (articles 1 and 24 ACHR), to social 
welfare and development (article 26 ACHR25) and to political participation 
(article 23 ACHR) should be interpreted and applied in light of the right to 
self-determination, so that they effectively enjoy the right to choose their 
own development path.
In addition to referring to Common article 1 ICCPR and ICESCR, the 
Inter-American Court should integrate article 3 of the UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), which explicitly vests a right 
to self-determination in ‘indigenous peoples’. The fact that the UNDRIP 
does not have the status of binding international law is not an obstacle, 
because the Court has not shied away from referring to soft law before.26 
Accordingly, the rewritten judgment consistently applies Common article 
1 ICCPR and ICESCR and article 3 UNDRIP to interpret the Sarayaku 
People’s rights to communal property, to cultural identity and to political 
participation (see for example, para 160).
IV. DEVELOPING THE FPIC NORM
The right to property is not absolute, nor are the rights of indigenous 
peoples. When scrutinizing the legitimacy of restrictions on indigenous 
peoples’ property rights, the Inter-American Court applies a two-stage 
analysis – ditto in the Sarayaku case (para 156). First, restrictions have to 
be established by law, necessary, proportionate and aimed at achieving a 
legitimate objective in a democratic society. Second, in cases  concerning 
natural resources on indigenous territory, the physical and cultural 
 survival of indigenous peoples may not be denied. Avoiding the negation 
of their survival was interpreted in the Saramaka case of 2006 as imposing 
three duties on states: to consult (with a view to achieving an agreement), 
to conduct environmental impact assessments and to ensure that the 
peoples affected reasonably share in the benefits.27
These duties do not do the trick, because there is no guarantee 
that the views of the consulted indigenous peoples will be adequately 
addressed.28 Furthermore, the benefits granted, definitely when purely 
25 If need be, article 26 ACHR can be read in conjunction with the right to 
property as the Inter-American Court did in earlier jurisprudence on second 
 generation rights. Lixinski (n 7) 600–2.
26 For example Moiwana v Suriname (n 5); see also Neuman (n 6).
27 Saramaka v Suriname (n 11), para 129; Antkowiak (n 15) 170–1.
28 See also Dannenmaier (n 19) 96. There is also a risk that the interests of 
indigenous communities are succumbed by the dominant majority and its (even 
454 Integrated human rights in practice
financial, may not be capable of compensating for any losses in terms 
of tradition, culture, religion and spiritual beliefs. Indigenous peoples 
may very well resist a project because they are fundamentally opposed to 
large-scale, capital-intensive, ecologically intrusive and export-oriented 
 projects.29 Accordingly, consultation and benefit-sharing do not ensure 
that  indigenous peoples can decide on their own development path. 
The silver lining in the Saramaka judgment, however, was the Court’s 
holding that the duty to consult amounts to a duty to obtain the FPIC 
of indigenous communities for ‘large-scale development or investment 
projects that would have a major impact’ within indigenous territories.30 
Obviously, indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination is respected in 
the case of FPIC.
In the Sarayaku judgment the Court seems to cast doubt on whether 
the FPIC requirement still stands. Not only did the Court not reiterate 
this standard – notwithstanding the argumentation by the Sarayaku 
representatives (paras 127 and 287) – but the judgment merely speaks 
of ‘an  appropriate and participatory process that guarantees the right 
to  consultation, particularly with regard to development or large-scale 
 investment plans’ (para 157).31 Neither did the Inter-American Commission 
argue that FPIC was required. The question is thus whether the Sarayaku 
case was so straightforward since the community had not even been 
consulted, or whether the case bears witness to a reluctance to accept that 
indigenous communities can veto projects that are approved by an elected 
government.
Instead of deviating from the Saramaka judgment, the Inter-American 
Court should have at least confirmed, and at best further developed, 
its FPIC requirement. In particular, corrections and clarifications are 
welcome in four regards. First of all, given the vague meaning of ‘major 
impact’, the level of protection will ultimately depend upon the body 
competent to decide whether consent is required for a particular project. 
Although the Court should be careful to adopt an abstract and thus 
democratic) decision-making, although indigenous communities are not always 
a minority. Kealeboga N Bojosi, ‘Towards an effective right of indigenous 
 minorities to political participation’ in S A Dersso (ed.), Perspectives on the Rights 
of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples in Africa (PULP 2010) 288.
29 see also César A Rodríguez-Garavito and Luis C Arenas, ‘Indigenous 
rights, transnational activism, and legal mobilization: The struggle of the U’wa 
Peoplemobilization’ in Boaventura de Sousa Santos and César A  Rodríguez-Garavito 
(eds), Law and Globalization from Below (Cambridge University Press 2005) 246.
30 Saramaka v Suriname (n 11), para 134.
31 Emphasis added.
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limiting definition, more guidance for states on the meaning of ‘major 
impact’ would be useful. For instance, consent is required for relocations 
according to article 16 of ILO Convention 169 and article 10 UNDRIP, 
and for the storage or disposal of hazardous substances within indigenous 
territories (article 29(2) UNDRIP).
Additional guidance can be found in the reports of the UN Special 
Rapporteurs on Indigenous Peoples. For instance, Rodolfo Stavenhagen 
wrote in 2003 that major development projects include the building or 
improvement of physical infrastructure, the large-scale exploitation of 
natural resources and the building of urban centres, tourist develop-
ments and military bases.32 In 2013 James Anaya held that as a general 
rule extractive projects in indigenous territories require FPIC.33 Also 
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) was 
concerned about the state’s ‘failure to undertake consultations as a basis 
for obtaining the prior, freely given and informed consent of indigenous 
peoples . . . for natural resource development projects that affect them’ in 
its concluding observations on Ecuador.34 Finally, in Poma v Peru35 the 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) held that ‘measures which substantially 
compromise or interfere with the culturally significant economic activities 
of . . . [an] indigenous community’ are only admissible on two conditions, 
one of which being that the community members have had the  opportunity 
to effectively participate in the decision-making process, which ‘requires 
not mere consultation but free, prior and informed consent’.36
Second, another matter capable for improvement in the Court’s FPIC 
requirement relates to the criterion of ‘large-scale’ projects. Although 
scale is a relevant criterion to assess a project’s impact, it is not  conclusive. 
Even ‘small’ projects may have such an impact upon indigenous peoples 
that they should only proceed with their consent. For instance, the 
Poma v Peru decision related to the diversion of the course of a river in 
the 1950s, followed by the drilling of 12 wells in the 1970s, as a result of 
32 UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and  fundamental 
freedoms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Human rights and  indigenous 
issues (UN Doc E/CN.4/2003/90 (2003)).
33 UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, 
Extractive industries and indigenous peoples (UN Doc A/HRC/24/41 (2013)).
34 Emphasis added. CESCR, Concluding observations on the third  periodic 
report of Ecuador (UN Doc E/C.12/ECU/CO/3 (2012)). See also CERD, Concluding 
observations on the combined 17th to 19th periodic reports of Ecuador (UN Doc 
CERD/C/ECU/CO/19).
35 Ángela Poma Poma v Peru (2009) HRC 1457/2006 (UN Doc CCPR/C/ 
95/D/1457/2006).
36 ibid, para 7.6.
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which  downstream wetlands gradually dried out. Third, FPIC should 
not be limited to ‘development or investment’ projects, as projects aimed 
at  protecting biodiversity, for instance, may also considerably impair 
 indigenous rights.37
And, fourth, FPIC should not only apply when communal  property 
rights are affected. Rather, indigenous peoples’ consent should be 
obtained whenever a decision affects their right to self-determination, 
whether it impairs their land rights, their cultural identity, their right to 
non-discrimination, their right to political participation or their right 
to social welfare and development. Therefore, states should not only 
conduct an  environmental impact assessment, but a broader human rights 
impact assessment in order to assess the impact of a particular project 
on  indigenous rights and to decide whether consultation suffices or 
consent has to be obtained (see para 157).38 Support for the need for such 
human rights impact assessment is found in the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights (also below), which in Principles 17 
to 21 encourage business enterprises to carry out human rights due 
diligence and impact assessments.39 Also the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) has demanded environmental and human rights impact 
 assessments for ‘governmental decision-making process[es] concerning 
complex issues of environmental and economic policy’.40
The rewritten judgment is changed at various places (for example, 
para 165bis) to give due account to the FPIC norm in line with earlier 
 jurisprudence. Furthermore, in order to guide states in deciding when 
FPIC is required, the following ‘improved’ guidelines are added (para 
165quater):
The degree of impact must be assessed in light of the results of the human rights 
impact assessment. Such an assessment determines the current human rights 
situation, predicts the potential impacts, both positive and negative, of the 
envisaged project on the human rights of the people concerned – in particular 
their ability to continue to foresee in their subsistence – assesses the probability 
37 Desmet (n 21) 66–9.
38 See generally for example Tarek F Maassaranit and others, ‘Extracting 
corporate responsibility: Towards a human rights impact assessment’ (2007) 40 
CILJ 135–69; Gauthier De Beco, ‘Human rights impact assessments’ (2009) 27 
NQHR 139–66.
39 UN Special Representative on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework (UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 (2011)).
40 Giacomelli v Italy (2006) ECHR 59909/00, para 83.
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that such effects will occur, identifies measures to mitigate or prevent negative 
effects and to maximize positive effects, and proposes possible alternatives.
The question remains, however, who should consent, since there may be 
disagreement within the community. As far as consultation is  concerned, 
the Inter-American Court refers to the ‘traditional decision-making 
 practices of the people or community’ (para 177). Nevertheless, the 
legitimacy of such consent is debatable if all decision-making power is 
 centralized in one authority. And, in any case, accountability within the 
indigenous community for such decision-making processes should be 
ensured.
V.  COMPREHENSIVELY SCRUTINIZING 
POTENTIAL HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
A fundamental characteristic of human rights is their interdependence. 
Hence, human rights bodies regularly face cases that raise several, 
closely related human rights concerns. Such cases can be addressed in 
two ways.41 First, given the specific circumstances at hand, one right 
can be considered inherent to the other. This implies that no separate 
analysis is necessary to highlight the specific issues raised by the former 
right, as these are incorporated in, or absorbed by, the reasoning under 
the ‘dominant’ right. An example can be found in the Operation Genesis 
case,42 where the Court did not rule on the applicants’ complaint  regarding 
their right to have their honour respected, as the facts were sufficiently 
analysed, and the violations conceptualized, under, inter alia, the right to 
personal integrity. Second, the human rights at stake can be considered as 
distinct but mutually reinforcing, so that each potential rights violation 
should be scrutinized separately, while taking account of the aggravating 
 circumstances of the other rights being violated as well. For instance, in 
Valle Jaramillo v Colombia,43 the Court held that the state’s inability to 
41 Loretta Feris, ‘Constitutional environmental rights: An under-utilised 
resource’ (2008) 24 SAJHR 29, 45–8. A third situation may arise when the finding 
of a violation requires the joint reading of two rights, whereby one right is used to 
 interpret and determine the scope of the other right. This is a somewhat different 
situation of interdependence, and not further considered for the purposes of this 
chapter.
42 The Afro-Descendant Communities Displaced from the Cacarica River 
Basin (Operation Genesis) v Colombia (2013) IACtHR C 270), para 338.
43 Valle Jaramillo et al. v Colombia (2008) IACtHR C 192, para 139.
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protect human rights defenders, resulting in the killing of one defender 
and the mistreatment and holding hostage of another, did not only violate 
the latter person’s right to human treatment but also his right to freedom 
of movement and residence.
In the Sarayaku judgment, the Inter-American Court conducted 
a  separate, albeit succinct, analysis of the Sarayaku representatives’ 
 complaint under their right to cultural identity. Deplorably, however, 
article 26 ACHR does not feature in this analysis and the Court’s 
finding of a  violation is based on the non-discrimination principle of 
article 1(1) ACHR (para 213).44 Meanwhile, the Court opted for the 
absorption approach as regards the Sarayaku People’s right to freedom 
of  movement and residence,45 their right to freedom of thought and 
expression, their political rights and their economic, social and cultural 
rights. In  particular, the Court held that the facts had been sufficiently 
analysed, and the  violations conceptualized, under its assessment of 
the right to property (paras 229–230). However, this approach is only 
justified in cases where the dominant right constitutes the basis of the 
plaintiffs’ claims. The absorption approach was, for instance,  justifiably 
applied to the  restrictions on freedom of movement and residence (article 
22 ACHR). The Court acknowledged that the  presence of  pentolite 
 explosives  unlawfully restricted the Sarayaku People’s  movement, 
hunting and other traditional activities – as regards the other acts 
there was  insufficient  evidence (paras 228–29). Nevertheless, since this 
 restriction was mainly due to the risks posed to their life and physical 
integrity, the Court decided that the infringements had been sufficiently 
examined among others under the (prevailing) rights to life and to 
 communal property.
On the other hand, the dominant right underpinning the Sarayaku 
People’s complaints concerning their right to property, their right to 
 cultural identity and their political rights is the right to  self-determination. 
The right to property being but one of the five dimensions of 
 self-determination (supra), should not absorb complaints dealing with 
 cultural and  political rights. Accordingly, the rewritten judgment explicitly 
qualifies the  interferences with the Sarayaku People’s cultural and  political 
44 This provision merely requires the progressive development of the  economic, 
social, educational, scientific and cultural standards set out in the Charter of the 
Organization of American States. Nevertheless, in the past the Court has used this 
provision in cases dealing with economic, social and cultural rights, in conjunction 
with the right to property, to scrutinize state conduct. Lixinski, (n 7), 600–2.
45 Notwithstanding its express finding of unlawful restriction on movement 
(para 229).
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rights as violations of articles 26 and 23 ACHR respectively (see for 
example para 230bis and further). The Court should also interpret these 
rights in light of indigenous peoples’ right to self-determination under 
Common article 1 ICCPR and ICESCR and article 3 UNDRIP (above), 
and thereby recognize their right to choose their own development path. 
This would adequately account for the interdependence between the right 
to self-determination and its five constituting dimensions.
Support for a separate analysis of the different allegations by indigenous 
communities can be found in the Endorois case.46 There, the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights did not end its analysis after 
finding a violation of the right to property but scrutinized the state’s 
conduct in light of all potential human rights violations. This bolstered its 
overall reasoning, inter alia, as regards cultural rights (para 249) and the 
right to development (para 283).
A separate analysis of the various alleged human rights violations not 
only does justice to the claims of the petitioners as they see them and 
contributes to the development of the human rights regime, but could also 
impact the relief granted, which would accord with the Court’s progressive 
jurisprudence on reparations.
VI.  CONSIDERING THE RIGHT TO LIVE IN A 
HEALTHY ENVIRONMENT
CGC’s exploration activities, including the detonation of explosives, 
destroyed forests, water sources, caves and subterranean rivers, and 
caused animals to migrate. The state did not contest this (paras 105 and 
218). The judgment refers to this impact on the natural environment in 
its discussion on the ‘rights to consultation and to communal property in 
relation to the right to cultural identity’, where the ‘strong bond that exists 
between the elements of nature and culture, on the one hand, and each 
member of the People’s sense of being, on the other’, is  emphasized (para 
219). Moreover, the Court addressed the risk that the 1,400 kilograms 
of remaining  explosives posed danger to the life and physical integrity 
of the members of the Sarayaku People, linking it to the state’s failure 
to  guarantee their right to communal property (para 248). Only the 
 consequences of the explosives still present on and buried in Sarayaku 
territory were considered in the section on the rights to life and personal 
46 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights 
Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya (2009) ACHPR 276/2003.
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integrity, not the  environmental impact of the prior exploration  activities – 
carried out without  consultation or consent of the Sarayaku People.
Accordingly, the Court did not assess the consequences of the  exploration 
for the environment as such, and consequently the impact thereof on the 
right of the Sarayaku People to live in a healthy  environment. It is  suggested 
that an explicit consideration of the right to a healthy  environment 
would have been beneficial for at least two reasons. First, subsuming 
 environmental impact under the right to cultural identity obscures the 
inherent value of the right of all human beings to a healthy environment – 
with or without a cultural-spiritual link to that  environment. Moreover, 
it disguises the impact of environmental degradation on other domains 
of life, such as livelihood security. This is particularly relevant for the 
(indigenous and non-indigenous) communities who mostly depend on the 
natural environment for their subsistence.
Considering the right to a healthy environment in the Sarayaku 
 judgment could be achieved in two ways: (A) through the independent 
right to a healthy environment, or (B) through the inclusion of this right 
in the right to life.
A. Adjudicating the Independent Right to a Healthy Environment
A first way to appropriately assess the environmental damage caused by 
the exploration activities of CGC would be to adjudicate the right to a 
healthy environment as an independent right. The right of everyone to 
live in a healthy environment as well as the obligation of states to promote 
the  protection, preservation and improvement of the  environment are 
enshrined in article 11 of the Additional Protocol to the American 
Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, Social, and 
Cultural Rights of 1988 (Protocol of San Salvador or PSS).47
The formulation of a ‘healthy’ environment seems to presuppose a 
link with human health. In the Sarayaku case, the water sources that 
were destroyed were needed to provide drinking water to the community 
(para 105), but no immediate health impacts were claimed. The question 
arises whether a link with human health must be demonstrated in order 
to allege a violation of the right to a healthy environment. Following 
the Indian Supreme Court in its case of Rural Litigation and Entitlement 
Kendra v Uttar Pradesh, the answer would be ‘no’. In casu, the petitioner 
claimed that unauthorized mining had caused environmental damage. 
The Supreme Court upheld the right to live in a healthy environment, 
47 Ecuador has ratified the Protocol in 1993, which entered into force in 1999.
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without establishing harm to human health. In this line of interpretation, 
 ‘protection of [the right to live in a healthy environment] may be sought 
when ongoing behaviour is damaging or likely to damage the  environment, 
regardless of an effect on human health’.48
The Inter-American human rights system, however, does not admit 
 individual petitions alleging that a state party violates its obligations in 
relation to the right to a healthy environment. Only trade union rights 
(article 8 PSS) and the right to education (article 13 PSS) can be brought 
before the Inter-American human rights organs through individual  petition 
(article 19(6) PSS). This means that article 11 PSS can only be referred to 
in petitions alleging violations of other rights of the American Convention 
and Declaration, on the basis of article 29 ACHR.49 Citizens who merely 
claim a violation of their right to live in a healthy environment, cannot 
bring a case before the Inter-American Commission.50
Given the indivisibility and interdependence of human rights, it seems 
difficult to justify that the justiciability of human rights is limited to 
certain rights, excluding others. Recognition of a human right in a binding 
legal instrument should have procedural consequences, that is submit-
ting the compliance with that human right by states parties to judicial or 
quasi-judicial scrutiny. The current ‘discrimination’ within human rights, 
especially when they are recognized in a single legally binding instrument 
(here the PSS), should therefore be challenged. Concerning the right to 
a healthy environment in particular, inspiration can be drawn from the 
African human rights system, where violations of the right of peoples to ‘a 
general satisfactory environment favourable to their development’ (article 
24 ACHPR) can be claimed, and have been found.51 Also at national level, 
litigation is increasingly taking place on the basis of a  constitutionally 
enshrined right to a healthy environment, with Latin America taking the 
lead.52
It is therefore suggested to draft an additional protocol that provides 
in the possibility to bring individual petitions on the basis of, at least, the 
48 Carl Bruch et al., ‘Constitutional environmental law: Giving force to 
 fundamental principles in Africa’ (2001) 26 CJEL 131, 151.
49 Jorge D Taillant, Environmental Advocacy and the Inter-American Human 
Rights System (Center for International Environmental Law 2001) 36.
50 David R Boyd, The Environmental Rights Revolution: A Global Study of 
Constitutions, Human Rights, and the Environment (UBC Press 2012) 85.
51 See for example on oil exploitation, Social and Economic Rights Action 
Center (SERAC) and Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) v Nigeria 
(2001) ACHPR155/96.
52 Boyd, (n 50). See also Bruch and others, (n 48).
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right to a healthy environment, and, preferably, all the rights established in 
the PSS. Such an effort would be in line with the evolution in international 
human rights law of increased submission of human rights performance to 
(quasi-)judicial scrutiny, as illustrated by the communication procedures 
for the ICESCR and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
which were created in 2008 and 2011 respectively.53 However, given the 
procedural changes required to be able to consider the right to a healthy 
environment independently, which cannot be realized overnight, the 
Sarayaku judgment has been rewritten on the basis of the second avenue 
proposed, namely integrating the right to a healthy environment in the 
right to life.
B. Integrating the Right to a Healthy Environment in the Right to Life
The Court does not seem to find a violation of the right to life in 
the  Sarayaku case, at least not explicitly. In the operative part of the 
 judgment, the state is found to be responsible for the ‘violation of the 
rights to’ consultation, indigenous communal property, cultural identity, 
judicial guarantees and judicial protection. By contrast, the Court holds 
that ‘the State is responsible for severely jeopardizing the rights to life and 
to personal integrity’ in relation to the obligation to guarantee the right 
to communal property, to the detriment of the members of the Sarayaku 
People.54 The consistency with the formulation in the main text of the 
judgment (‘the State is responsible for having put at grave risk the rights 
to life and physical integrity of the Sarayaku People’, para 249)55 suggests 
that this nuance in language should be taken into account.56
In recent years, the ‘greening’ of human rights has mushroomed, 
where ‘[t]ribunals have come to view environmental protection as 
 essential for the equal enjoyment of, in particular, the rights to life, 
health,  adequate  standard of living, home life, and property’.57 The 
53 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (UN Doc A/RES/63/117); Optional Protocol to the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child on a communications procedure (UN Doc A/RES/66/138).
54 Emphasis added. Also note that this operative paragraph concerns members 
of the Sarayaku People, whereas the violations were established to the detriment of 
the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku.
55 Here ‘people’ are referred to (compare n 54).
56 A comprehensive search of the Inter-American Court’s case law database 
for the use of similar formulations in other judgments was impossible due to the 
malfunctioning of the search function.
57 Donald K Anton and Dinah L Shelton, Environmental Protection and 
Human Rights (Cambridge University Press 2011), 436. The European Court of 
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 Inter-American Commission had already noted, in 1997, that ‘[c]ondi-
tions of severe  environmental  pollution, which may cause serious  physical 
illness,  impairment and  suffering on the part of the local populace, 
are  inconsistent with the right to be respected as a human being’.58 In 
various cases on indigenous peoples’ rights in the Inter-American human 
rights system, environmental degradation was identified as leading to 
or  aggravating certain human rights violations, such as the right to 
 property.59 The proposed approach goes one step further, however, 
as it does not only consist in finding a violation of other human rights 
caused by environmental harm, but integrates an actual right to a healthy 
 environment – here in the right to life.
Such integration can also build on evolutions in human rights 
 jurisprudence elsewhere, where the right to a healthy environment is 
increasingly considered as being included in other human rights.60 In at least 
12 countries where the constitution does not provide a right to a healthy 
environment, national courts have argued that this right  constitutes an 
essential component of the right to life.61 The Supreme Court of India has 
played a pioneering role, stating that the right to life – protected by article 
21 of its Constitution – ‘encompasses within its ambit the protection and 
preservation of the environment, ecological balance, freedom from pol-
lution of air and sanitation, without which life cannot be enjoyed. Any 
Human Rights, for instance, has found violations of the right to private life and 
the home (article 8 ECHR) caused by environmental harm. See for example López 
Ostra v Spain (1994) ECHRC-303.
58 IACHR, Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador (1997) (OEA/
Ser.L/V.II.96).
59 See for example Awas Tingni v Nicaragua (n 9); Saramaka v Suriname 
(n 11).
60 For instance, the European Committee of Social Rights has interpreted the 
right to protection of health in article 11 of the European Social Charter to include 
the right to a healthy environment. Marangopoulos Foundation for Human Rights 
v Greece (2006) ECSR 30/2005, para 195. Also at national level, the right to health 
has been interpreted in relation to a healthy environment. For example, a High 
Court in South Africa found that the rights to have access to health care services 
and sufficient water (section 27(1)(a) and (b)) of the South African Bill of Rights) 
places ‘an obligation on all spheres of governance to ensure a healthy environment 
to the communities’ – even though section 24 of the Bill of Rights establishes the 
independent right of everyone ‘to an environment that is not harmful to their 
health or wellbeing’. The Federation for Sustainable Environment and The Silobela 
concerned community v The Minister of Water Affairs and others (2012) North 
Gauteng High Court (South Africa) 35672/12, ZAGPPHC 140 (South Africa), 
para 13.
61 Boyd (n 50) 82.
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contract or action which would cause  environmental  pollution . . . should 
be regarded as amounting to a violation of Article 21.’62
In the Sarayaku case, the integration of the right to a healthy 
 environment in the right to life would imply that the Court would assess 
not only the impact of the explosives on the life and physical integrity of 
the Sarayaku People, but also the other environmental damage caused 
by the  exploration activities, such as the destruction of forests and water 
sources. Consequently, the probability increases63 that the Court would 
have found a violation of the right to life, instead of only a  jeopardization. 
The  judgment has been rewritten from that perspective. Reparation 
 measures must then include not only the appropriate handling of the 
 pentolite, but also the full restoration of environmental degradation, 
beyond the  reforestation currently required (para 294).
VII. MAINSTREAMING CHILDREN’S RIGHTS
Whereas both the petitioners’ claim and the Inter-American Commission’s 
admissibility decision explicitly mentioned article 19 ACHR on the rights 
of the child as possibly violated,64 this provision was not included in the 
application submitted by the Commission to the Court.65 In its Merits 
Report, the Commission stated that ‘it did not have sufficient probative 
elements to rule on the alleged violation’ of the article.66 Nevertheless, 
at various places throughout the judgment, the impact on the rights 
and well-being of children and young people is referred to, by both the 
 representatives of the Sarayaku People and the Court.
Concretely, children and young people are mainly mentioned as 
regards three matters: (i) the impact on their rights to education and 
to  cultural identity; (ii) the impact on their health and safety; and (iii) 
their  participation. To start, the Court held that ‘the interruption of the 
 community’s daily activities and the dedication of the adults to the defence 
62 Virender Gaur v State of Haryana (1994) Supreme Court (India) 2 SCC 
577.
63 Given the limited factual information, it is difficult to pronounce with 
 certainty on whether the environmental impact amounted to a violation in the 
specific case under consideration 
64 IACHR, Admissibility in re: the Kichwa People of the Sarayaku Community 
and its Members v Ecuador (Report n° 64/04 (2004)), paras 2, 20 and 74.
65 IACHR, Application to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in re: 
the Kichwa People of the Sarayaku Community and its Members v Ecuador (2010).
66 IACHR, Merits in re: the Kichwa People of the Sarayaku Community and 
its Members v Ecuador (Report n°138/09 (2009)).
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of their territory have had an impact on teaching children and young 
people about their traditions and cultural rituals, and on perpetuating the 
spiritual knowledge of the sages’ (para 218). Moreover, ‘the seismic line 
passed near sacred sites used for ceremonies initiating young people into 
adulthood’ (para 105). The adverse effects on the education of children 
and young people were also mentioned in the representatives’ demand 
for compensation of non-pecuniary damage (para 320). They pointed out 
that in addition to ‘the effects on the ancestral education, the education 
of the children and young people was also affected due to the suspension 
of classes in schools for three months, during which time the youngest 
children were left at home and the young people joined the Peace and Life 
Camps to protect their territory’ (note 368).
Second, the impact on the health and safety of children and young 
people is pointed to. As such, the representatives alleged that ‘during the 
period of food shortages and state of emergency, there were case [sic] of 
illnesses that mainly affected children and the elderly, a situation described 
as “fatal to the health of Sarayaku members who were prevented from 
having access to health care centers,” which affected their right to life’ 
(para 234). Moreover, the Court referred to a report of the Human Rights 
Committee of the Ecuadorian Congress, which concluded that ‘[h]uman 
rights have been violated because serious psychological harm was caused 
to the children of the community who witnessed the confrontations with 
the soldiers, the police and CGC security personnel’ (para 196). In their 
claims for reparation, the representatives specified the effects on health 
and safety of children as follows: ‘the children have lived in fear of the 
militarization of the territory and for the fate of their parents’ (note 369).
Although the Sarayaku representatives specifically mentioned the 
impact on children in their demands for reparation, they did not ask for 
child-specific reparation measures, but for an amount in equity to repair 
non-pecuniary damage. Following this request, the Court established the 
sum of US$1,250,000 as compensation for non-pecuniary damage, to be 
invested as the Sarayaku People see fit, in, among others, ‘educational, 
cultural . . . health care . . .. projects’ (para 323). It is commendable that 
the Court leaves the decision of how to spend the sum to the Sarayaku 
People, in line with their right to choose their own development path 
(above). Attention to children is implicitly included in the reference to 
educational projects.
Finally, during its field visit, the Court’s delegation heard various 
 statements from members of the Sarayaku people, ‘including young 
people . . . and children from the community’ (para 21). It is positive 
that children and young people were listened to in the course of the 
 proceedings. According to the Court, these statements ‘cannot be assessed 
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in isolation, but rather within the context of the evidence as a whole, 
because they are useful insofar as they can provide additional information 
about the alleged violations and their consequences’ (para 49).
Overall, the Sarayaku judgment illustrates the tension noticeable in 
(children’s) human rights research, policies and jurisprudence between 
not artificially separating children from the larger group, on the one 
hand, and paying sufficient attention to children’s specific needs and 
rights  generated by, among others, their age, evolving capacities and legal 
 position, on the other.67 Especially when attention focuses on another 
marker of  distinctiveness – like indigenousness here – as the generator 
of particular rights and violations, the danger exists that attention to 
diversity within the indigenous group, for example, for children and young 
people, decreases or is minimal, which constitutes a risk for both  external 
actors like judges and the indigenous groups themselves. The latter 
sometimes face  intergenerational conflicts, whereby the voices of children 
and young people may not be sufficiently heard in community decision-
making  processes.68 This raises questions as to the appropriateness from 
a  children’s rights perspective of ‘culturally appropriate procedures’ 
 according to which indigenous peoples need to be consulted (para 201), 
when these procedures do not give space to children and young people.69
To a certain extent, both the Sarayaku representatives and the Court 
incorporate attention to the impact on children and young people in their 
considerations as regards other (general) human rights, as demonstrated 
above. However, given the fact that it is acknowledged that children 
 suffered in a different way than adults as regards their education, health 
and safety, it is somewhat surprising that the Commission did not include 
article 19 ACHR in its application. Article 19 ACHR guarantees the right 
of every child ‘to the measures of protection required by his condition as 
a minor on the part of his family, society, and the state’.70 The emphasis 
on protection reflects the zeitgeist of the American Convention, adopted 
20 years before the CRC. In the Street Children case, the Court explicitly 
67 See Didier Reynaert et al., ‘Introduction’ in Wouter Vandenhole et al. 
(eds), Routledge International Handbook of Children’s Rights Studies (Routledge 
2015) 3–6; Ellen Desmet and others, ‘Conclusions’ in Vandenhole et al. (above) 
427.
68 See for example Natasha Blanchet-Cohen, ‘Indigenous children’s rights: 
Opportunities in appropriation and transformation’ in Vandenhole et al. (n 67) 
371–86.
69 See also Morten Haugen, ‘Deciding on land and resources: How can the 
influence of the most affected within communities be increased?’(2013) 7 HRILD 
262-291 (focusing on women).
70 Emphasis added.
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adopted an integrated approach as regards children’s rights: ‘[b]oth the 
American Convention and the Convention on the Rights of the Child form 
part of a very comprehensive international corpus juris for the protection 
of the child that should help this Court establish the content and scope of’ 
article 19 ACHR.71 In its 2002 Advisory Opinion, the Court emphasized 
that education and care for the health of children are key special measures 
of protection implied in article 19 ACHR, referring to other children’s 
rights standards.72 Given the negative impact on children’s education, 
health and safety in the Sarayaku case, an argument could therefore be 
constructed that the state failed to comply with its obligation to adopt 
special measures to protect the children whose rights were under threat 
or violated. However, it must also be acknowledged that the impact was 
mostly of a temporary nature (for example, suspension of classes for three 
months), which may not pass the threshold required to find a human 
rights violation. Therefore, and given the impossibility of evaluating all 
the evidence, the Commission’s decision to not include article 19 ACHR 
was respected in the rewriting.
Nevertheless, children’s rights were more explicitly mainstreamed in 
the rewritten judgment in relation to the following three issues: (i) the 
 justification of hearing children and young people in the Court’s field 
visit (para 21); (ii) the undertaking of consultation processes using 
 culturally appropriate procedures (para 201); and (iii) the reparation for 
 non-pecuniary damage (para 323).
VIII.  ACKNOWLEDGING CORPORATE 
ACCOUNTABILITY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS 
VIOLATIONS
Human rights law has traditionally taken the protection of the individual 
citizen against the state to heart. Therefore, as a general rule, private actors 
do not bear direct human rights obligations under international law that 
trigger their responsibility in case of non- compliance.73 National bills of 
71 ‘Street Children’ (Villagran-Morales et al.) v Guatemala (1999) IACtHR 
C 77, para 194.
72 Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child (2002) IACtHR 
OC-17/2002, paras 84 and 86.
73 Lillian A Miranda, ‘The hybrid state-corporate enterprise and violations 
of indigenous land rights: Theorizing corporate responsibility and accountability 
under international law’ (2007) 11 LCLR 135, 162. The exception is gross human 
rights violations that constitute international crimes, for which the criminal 
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rights sometimes do impose duties on private actors, but even then account-
ability is generally ensured through actions by the state.74 Nevertheless, in 
a world of economic globalization the image of  ‘omnipotent’ states is 
fading, whilst the power and leverage of non-state actors,75 in  particular 
international financial institutions and  (transnational) corporations, 
accrue. As a result, such non-state actors can be as capable as a state of 
infringing upon human rights.
Whereas regional and international human rights bodies76 have 
 acknowledged that human rights can be violated by private actors, 
they continue to focus on the obligation of the state to protect its 
citizens against such violations.77 Likewise, in the Sarayaku case, only the 
 international legal responsibility of the state is triggered, notwithstanding 
that the concrete threat to the Sarayaku People’s rights stems from CGC’s 
exploration activities. As such, the judgment is a missed opportunity for 
the Inter-American Court to explicitly hold that non-state actors have 
to respect human rights. While it is true that human rights bodies lack 
jurisdiction over non-state actors to hold them directly liable, the mere 
fact that there is no remedy to enforce an obligation does not mean that 
the obligation cannot exist.78 Accordingly, lack of jurisdiction should not 
withhold the Inter-American Court from at least expressly recognizing 
that non-state actors must respect human rights,79 – while recognizing 
responsibility of natural persons may be established by an international tribunal 
or court.
74 See for example Section 8 of the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996.
75 The Sarayaku case specifically dealt with a transnational corporation. 
However, the concept of ‘non-state actors’ as used in this chapter covers all 
legal persons, including but not limited to corporations (whether transnational 
or domestic). Whenever the term ‘private actors’ is used, both natural and legal 
persons are included.
76 Aoife Nolan, ‘Addressing economic and social rights violations by  non-state 
actors through the role of the state: A comparison of regional approaches to 
the “obligation to protect”’ (2009) 9 HRLR 225. See for example the African 
Commission’s decision in Social and Economic Rights Action Center (SERAC) v 
Nigeria (n 51).
77 Nolan, (n 76).
78 Andrew Clapham, Human Rights Obligations of Non-State Actors (Oxford 
University Press 2006), 74 and 267.
79 The type of human rights obligations that could be imposed on non-state 
actors is one of the most contentious issues in the debate concerning business 
and human rights, and was one of the reasons why the UN Norms were never 
adopted by the Human Rights Council. However, the duty to respect does not only 
require non-state actors to do no harm, but also to take the positive action directly 
required for their activities not to be harmful to human rights.
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that, for the time being, the state remains responsible for enforcing these 
duties of non-state actors.
For instance, in the judgment the Court emphasizes the duty to consult80 
of the state of Ecuador. However, when a collaborative project, such as an 
oil concession, risks infringing on human rights, both state and non-state 
actors should bear human rights obligations.81 Without any prejudice to 
the duty of states to consult before adopting legislative and administrative 
measures that affect indigenous peoples, non-state actors that execute a 
specific decision that touches upon these peoples’ rights should equally 
consult them.82 In addition, non-state actors should refrain from engaging 
with a particular state, when they know or ought to know that this state 
has violated its human rights obligations, for instance by having failed 
to  consult.83 States thus remain primarily responsible for human rights, 
but their responsibility is complemented by duties for  non-state actors 
that must be complied with simultaneously, not  subsidiarily.84 These 
 complementary and simultaneous obligations would bolster the  protection 
of indigenous rights, in particular, and of human rights, in general.85
Reference can be made in this regard to the idea of ‘common but dif-
ferentiated responsibilities’ that exists in environmental law. According to 
this idea, developed and developing states have common responsibilities 
to protect the environment and to promote sustainable development, but 
the content of their respective responsibilities differs depending on a given 
state’s social, economic and ecological situation.86 Similarly, state and 
non-state actors have a common responsibility vis-à-vis human rights, but 
their respective duties are different in view of their distinct involvement in 
the particular situation that risks interference with human rights.
The Inter-American Court could find support for such direct 
 acknowledgment of the human rights obligations of non-state actors 
80 In this section the ‘duty to consult’ should be understood as amounting 
to a duty to obtain the FPIC of indigenous peoples, when required as discussed 
earlier ().
81 Miranda, (n 73).
82 See also ibid, 178.
83 ibid, 178–9.
84 For a discussion of how obligations can be attributed to different actors, 
see for example Wouter Vandenhole (ed.), Challenging Territoriality in Human 
Rights Law: Towards Foundational Principles for a Multi Duty-Bearer Human 
Rights Regime (Routledge 2015).
85 See also Miranda (n 73) 154–5.
86 Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
of 1992, adopted by the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development having met at Rio de Janeiro from 3 to 14 June 1992.
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not only in (emerging) human rights law, but also in other branches of 
 international law, in particular criminal and environmental law. First, 
there are various international soft law instruments in which non-state 
actors accept, on a voluntary basis, a moral responsibility to respect human 
rights. An example is the UN Global Compact, which proclaims in its first 
two principles that ‘businesses should support and respect the  protection 
of internationally proclaimed human rights’, and ‘make sure that they 
are not complicit in human rights abuses’.87 In the UN Framework and 
Guiding Principles on business and human rights, UN Special Rapporteur 
John Ruggie endorsed the idea that non-state actors should act with due 
diligence and in conformity with their responsibility to respect human 
rights.88 Such corporate social responsibility is also reflected in the work 
of UN treaty monitoring bodies. For instance, the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights  acknowledges that companies 
have human rights responsibilities, but that their  accountability for 
 non-compliance has to be ensured by the state.89
Whilst international human rights law currently falls short of  explicitly 
recognizing that non-state actors bear human rights obligations as opposed 
to mere moral responsibilities, international environmental law has 
imposed direct duties on non-state actors in some instances. For example, 
the Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution and the Convention 
on the Protection of the Environment through Criminal Law stipulate 
 obligations for non-state actors that state parties should  implement in 
their domestic legal system.90 An important step has also been taken in 
international criminal law, since the proposed amendments to the Draft 
Protocol of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights establish 
 jurisdiction of the African Court over legal persons for international 
crimes, such as the most egregious human rights violations.91
87 See UN Global Compact, ‘The Ten Principles’, accessed 17 March 2017 
at https://www.unglobalcompact.org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html.
88 See Principle 11 of the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, 
(n 39).
89 See for example CESCR, ‘General Comment 12: The Right to Adequate 
Food (Art 11)’ (UN Doc E/C.12/1999/5), para 20.
90 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage of 
29 November 1969, 973 UNTS 3; Council of Europe Convention on the Protection 
of the Environment through Criminal Law of 4 November 1988, CETS 172.
91 Cases can only be brought by the prosecutor, however. Articles 28A and 
34A of the Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the 
African Court of Justice and Human Rights, as adopted at the 23rd ordinary 
session of the Assembly of the African Union (Assembly/AU/Dec.529 (XXIII) 
2014).
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Nonetheless, the most pertinent source of guidance for the 
 Inter-American Court are best practices from domestic judiciaries in 
states where human rights apply to both state and private actors. One such 
example is South Africa,92 where the Constitution explicitly  acknowledges 
that private actors have human rights obligations. In accordance with 
the subsidiarity principle, however, rather than directly applying the 
Constitution to companies, judges first try to enforce the human rights 
duties of companies by interpreting, applying and – when common law 
rules are concerned – developing, existing private law.93 In any case, 
the practical importance of such jurisprudence is that, on the one hand, 
 non-state actors are plainly held to be bound by the Bill of Rights and, 
on the other hand, they are cited as interested parties in the proceedings 
because although the relief is ordered against the state, the judgment is 
likely to have a direct impact on them.94
What is proposed in concreto in the rewritten judgment is that the 
Inter-American Court explicitly holds that not only the state of Ecuador 
but also CGC has obligations in terms of the ACHR (see for example, 
para 177bis). The practical implications thereof are threefold. First, the 
Court should scrutinize the conduct of the non-state actor more closely 
and thereby contribute to building a framework of complementary human 
rights obligations between states and non-state actors.95 Second, this idea 
of complementary obligations should be reflected in the reparations. 
Even though such relief can only directly target the state,96 the concrete 
 consequences for non-state actors could come to the surface more clearly. 
For instance, the Court should order the state to ensure that non-state 
actors executing a project affecting the rights of indigenous communities 
consult them. Furthermore, the state should encourage the  participation 
of non-state actors to the training programs or courses, which were 
92 See for example Governing Body of the Juma Musjid Primary School and 
Others v Essay N.O. and Others (2011) Constitutional Court (South Africa) CCT 
29/10 [2011] ZACC 13 and Boycott, Divestment And Sanctions South Africa and 
Another v Continental Outdoor Media (Pty) Ltd. and Others (2014) High Court 
(South Africa) 2013/19700 [2014] ZAGPJHC 200.
93 Bengwenyama Minerals (Pty) Ltd and Others v Genorah Resources (Pty) 
Ltd and Others (2010) Constitutional Court (South Africa) CCT 39/10 [2010] 
ZACC 26.
94 For instance, in Bengwenyama v Genorah (n 93) the Constitutional Court 
set aside the decision of the responsible authorities to grant a prospecting right to 
Genorah.
95 See also Miranda (n 73) 183.
96 Contra ibid, 179–80 (alluding to the possibility of imposing damages or 
sanctions directly on non-state actors).
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ordered by the Court, on indigenous peoples’ rights and on engaging with 
such communities.
Third, the Inter-American Court should acknowledge that since CGC 
was responsible for degrading the environment within the Sarayaku 
 territory, the company should in principle also bear the costs of the 
restoration. This would also correspond to the polluter pays principle 
in international environmental law, which aims at the internalization of 
environmental costs: the polluter should bear the expenses of  preventing 
and controlling the pollution.97 ‘Pollution’ has been defined as ‘the 
introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substance or energy into 
the [environment] resulting in deleterious effects of such a nature as to 
endanger human health [and] harm living resources’.98 There is no doubt 
that the placement of explosives in the Sarayaku territory constitutes 
such pollution, given that the Court has held that the state, by allowing 
explosives to be introduced in the territory, was responsible for having put 
the community’s rights to life and physical integrity at grave risk (paras 
248–249). Guidance is again provided by the jurisprudence of the Indian 
Supreme Court, which plays a leadership role in applying the polluter 
pays principle and has held that ‘it is not the role of government to meet 
the costs involved in either prevention of such damage, or in carrying out 
remedial action’99 and, more even, that under the polluter pays principle 
the polluter should not only compensate the victims but also bear the cost 
of restoring the environmental degradation.100 Accordingly, the rewritten 
judgment incorporates the polluter pays principle by holding, inter alia, 
that the state could recover the costs of removing the pentolite from CGC 
(see, for example, para 246).
An important difference between the rewritten judgment and the 
approach of the South African judiciary explained earlier is that  non-state 
actors cannot be cited before the Inter-American Court, which lacks 
 97 See OECD Recommendation of the Council on Guiding Principles 
Concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies, Annex 
I, 1972. See also Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration (in a weakened form) (n 77).
 98 Anton and Shelton (n 57) 438. Definition inspired by article 1 of the 
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution of 1979 and other 
environmental treaties.
 99 Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v Union of India (1996) Supreme 
Court (India) 3 SCC 212.
100 Vellore Citizens Welfare Forum v Union Of India & Ors (1996) Supreme 
Court (India) 5 SCC 647. However, these principles have ‘neither been followed 
consistently nor been institutionalized to make a long term impact for the environ-
mental jurisprudence process’. G Sahu, ‘Implications of Indian Supreme Court’s 
innovations for environmental jurisprudence’ (2008) 4 LEDJ 385.
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competence over non-state actors. Admittedly, however, this also deprives 
non-state actors of an opportunity to explain their conduct or policies 
when these are scrutinized by the Court, although they should be able 
to defend themselves within the domestic legal system, when the state 
indeed holds them accountable through domestic remedies.101 In the 
Sarayaku case, however, the liability of CGC was excluded by the Deed 
of Termination, which stipulated that the contractor would not incur 
any environmental liability. The Inter-American Court should have 
denounced this agreement, since it prevents the Sarayaku People from 
holding CGC accountable for the environmental degradation (see for 
example, para 177quinquies).
IX.  INTRODUCING AN INTEGRATED APPROACH 
TO RIGHTS HOLDERS
Until now, this chapter has focused on an integrated approach to human 
rights norms. We end with a reflection regarding the second aspect of 
an integrated view to human rights, as proposed by Brems, namely the 
‘maximum inclusion of rights holders’. This requires ‘taking into account 
the human rights of all rights holders whose rights are affected by a 
 particular situation’.102 In the Sarayaku case, it is mentioned that various 
neighbouring communities signed agreements with the oil company, 
which in return invested in infrastructure, production projects, health and 
education as compensation for the seismic survey activities (paras 74 and 
82). The fact that these communities entered into an agreement with the 
company does not mean, however, that their rights (to be consulted by the 
government, for instance) have not been affected. The Court also  explicitly 
referred to the existence of other potentially affected rights holders:103
101 Nevertheless, they are able to defend themselves within the domestic legal 
system, at which level their accountability is enforced.
102 Eva Brems, ‘Should pluriform human rights become one? Exploring the 
benefits of human rights integration’ (2014) 3 EJHR 447, 452.
103 In its field visit, the Court adopted a rather ambiguous approach. The 
state had requested a visit to the ‘Rio Bobonaza communities’. However, since 
the  complaint referred to events that occurred on Sarayaku territory and its 
 surroundings, it was decided to limit the visit to that territory ‘which is not affected 
by the fact that a visit was also made to the community that lives in the area known 
as Jatun Molino, in response to the corresponding proposal by the representatives 
and the State’ (n 21), ‘where they listened to some of the local people’ (para 21). 
The Court took this information into account as contextual information, ‘but will 
not make any determination as regards that community’ (para 50).
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The Court is aware that [the Sarayaku] community lives in a territory where 
there are other indigenous communities and that, naturally, links exist between 
them and there may be both divergent and converging interests and rights of 
other communities. However, in the context of the present case, it is not for this 
Court to make determinations regarding other communities, populations or 
persons who are not petitioners in this case. (note 21)
This holding seems to point to a kind of uneasiness from the Court with 
its limitation ratione personae of making determinations. It recognizes 
that there are individuals and communities with interests and rights that 
concur or conflict with those of the petitioners, who are not considered in 
the case at hand. These other persons and groups may or may not have 
suffered from human rights violations. If violations did occur, they may 
not have disposed of the human, financial and/or technical resources to 
submit a complaint before the Inter-American human rights system, or 
may not have been interested in doing so. The reparations granted to 
the  petitioners may however lead to inequalities on the ground between 
the ‘haves’ of a judgment and reparations – upon the condition of 
effective implementation – and the ‘have-nots’. This may heat up local 
 dynamics especially when, as in the present case, the relationships between 
the  petitioners and the neighbouring communities are already seriously 
 disrupted (para 234). These consequences are, however, inherent to the 
current way of functioning of judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, 
which only consider the rights of applicants.104
How could a more inclusive approach to rights holders be achieved, in 
a way that remains feasible and manageable for the Court? The Court is 
formally not in the position to make determinations regarding persons 
or groups who are not petitioners in a case.105 Nevertheless, at the level 
of the Inter-American Commission, the system provides the procedural 
 possibility to adopt a more comprehensive approach to rights holders.
Only the Commission and state parties may submit a case before the 
Court (article 61(1) ACHR). There is a very broad provision as to who has 
standing to file a petition before the Commission, namely ‘[a]ny person 
or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized’ 
(article 44 ACHR). More important here is that the Commission may 
also initiate a petition motu proprio, when it considers that the neces-
104 Brems (n 102) 453.
105 The Court has allowed petitioners to add new victims (mostly next of kin) 
after the case was submitted to it by the Commission, on the basis of the jura novit 
curia principle. This broad application has been criticized in that the proceedings 
before the Commission are long enough to be able to add all relevant facts – and 
victims – to the case at that stage. See Shelton (n 17) 208.
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sary requirements are met (article 24 Rules of Procedure IACHR of 
2009; formerly article 26(2) of the Regulations of the IACHR of 1992). 
In Blake v Guatemala, the Court interpreted this provision as referring 
to the  possibility not only of filing a ‘new’ petition, but also of includ-
ing other victims in an existing application.106 In that case, a journalist 
(Mr Blake) and a photographer (Mr Davis) had been killed in 1985 by 
Guatemalan civil patrons. Their remains were only discovered in 1992, 
whereby Mr  Davis was identified before Mr Blake (para 52(a) and 
(b)). Nevertheless, the case submitted before the Court only concerned 
Mr Blake. The Court was ‘surprised that the Commission did not use its 
authority’ to add Mr Davis as a victim (para 85), but the Commission’s 
justification was that his relatives were not interested in filing a petition. 
The Court however  confirmed the Commission’s authority ‘to act motu 
proprio on the basis of any available information, even without an explicit 
petition of Mr. Griffith Davis’ relatives’ (para 85). Since this had not been 
done, the Court could only rule on the events as regards Mr Blake.
There is thus an explicit procedural opening in the Inter-American 
human rights system to achieve a more inclusive approach to rights 
holders in a particular case, namely on the basis of a motu proprio action 
of the Commission. Shelton has argued against this possibility, holding 
that ‘[a]ny perceived additional victims should be informed of the right 
to bring their own petition and should not be added to the petition 
under  consideration, thereby diluting attention to claims of the primary 
victim’.107 If the additional victims are next of kin of the primary victim, 
the risk of dilution of attention to the claims of the primary victim may 
indeed be there, since the next of kin can be considered secondary victims. 
If, however, other persons or groups are also direct victims of the same 
events, it does not seem justified, from a human rights perspective, to 
exclude them from recognition and remedies.
In this sense, one could wonder if – from a human rights integra-
tion viewpoint – one should not move from a ‘personal’ approach in 
(quasi-)judicial proceedings (focusing on the petitioners) to a more 
‘factual/case-based’ approach. This would turn around the reasoning, 
whereby the Commission would not assess the human rights viola-
tions caused to a certain person or group, but would assess the human 
rights violations caused by certain acts or omissions from a more holistic 
perspective, for a broader range of victims than only the petitioners 
who submitted the complaint under consideration. Such a case-based 
106 Blake v Guatemala (1998) IACtHR C 36.
107 Shelton (n 17), 210.
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approach could draw  inspiration from the functioning of Truth and 
Reconciliation Commissions, which in their mandate first focus on the 
events to be  investigated (for example, gross violations of human rights 
and/or  violations of  international humanitarian law) and then on the iden-
tification of persons involved.108 Moreover, support can even be found in 
a careful reading of article 63(1) ACHR itself: ‘If the Court finds that there 
has been a  violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, 
the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his 
right or freedom that was violated’.109 The provision does not require the 
injured party to be an applicant.
Arguably, such a case-based approach would imply a radical change of 
the functioning of the current human rights system, with many challenges 
to think about and stings to remove. In the rewritten judgment, an obiter 
dictum has been included as a first step in this direction (paras 284bis–
284ter). From an integrative perspective to human rights holders, it seems 
worthwhile to further explore the potential of a case-based approach to 
human rights violations.
108 See for example article 4 of the Promotion of National Unity and 
Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (South Africa) and article IV of an Act to Establish 
the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Liberia, 2005 (Liberia).
109 Emphasis added.
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APPENDIX
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS
CASE OF THE KICHWA INDIGENOUS PEOPLE OF 
SARAYAKU v ECUADOR 
JUDGMENT OF JUNE 27, 2012
(Merits and reparations)
21. For the first time in the history of the Inter-American Court’s judicial 
practice, a delegation of judges conducted a proceeding at the site of the 
events of a contentious case submitted to its jurisdiction. Thus, on April 
21, 2012, a delegation from the Court, accompanied by delegations from 
the Commission, the representatives, and the State, visited the territory 
of the Sarayaku People. Upon arrival, the delegations were received by 
numerous members of the Sarayaku People. After crossing the Bobonaza 
River in canoes, they went to the People’s assembly house (Tayjasaruta), 
where they were received by the President, José Gualinga, the kurakas, the 
yachaks and other authorities and members of the People. Also present 
were representatives from other indigenous communities of Ecuador. 
There, the Court’s delegation heard numerous statements from members 
of the Sarayaku, including young people, women, men, the elderly and 
children (given the right of children to express their views on matters that 
affect them, and to these views being given due weight in accordance with their 
age and maturity, as enshrined in Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (CRC)) from the community, who shared their  experiences, 
views and expectations about their way of life, their  worldview and their 
experience in relation to the facts of the case. The President of the Court 
also gave the members of the delegations an opportunity to express their 
views. At that point, the Secretary for Legal Affairs of the Presidency of the 
Republic, Alexis Mera, formally acknowledged the State’s  responsibility 
(infra paras. 23 and 24). Lastly, the delegations went on a walking tour 
around the community, specifically the center of Sarayaku, where the 
People performed various cultural activities and rituals. The delegations 
also overflew the territory, observing the places where the events of the 
case occurred. Subsequently, the delegations visited the village of Jatun 
Molino, where they listened to some of the local people.
. . .
VIII. MERITS
VIII.1 THE INTERPRETATION OF THE AMERICAN CONVENTION 
IN THE PRESENT CASE
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123bis. The rights of indigenous peoples in terms of the American Convention, 
in particular their right not to be discriminated (Article 1(1)), their right to 
communal ownership (Article 21), their right to political participation 
(Article 23), their right to cultural identity (Articles 1(1) and 26) and their 
economic and social rights (Article 26) have to be applied in conformity 
with Article 29(b) of the Convention, which prohibits an interpretation of 
any  provision of the Convention in a manner that restricts its enjoyment to 
a lesser degree than what is recognized in the domestic laws of the State in 
question or in another treaty to which the State is a party.
123ter. Ecuador has ratified the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), the International Covenant on Economic, Social, 
and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the ILO Convention No. 169 on 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (ILO Convention 169), and has voted in 
favor of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(UNDRIP).
123quater. The Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Right has 
interpreted common Article 1 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR as being 
applicable to indigenous peoples. Accordingly, by virtue of the right of 
 indigenous peoples to self-determination recognized under said Article 1, 
they may “freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development”, 
and may “freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources” so as not to 
be “deprived of [their] own means of subsistence”.
123quinquies. In addition, Article 7(1) of ILO Convention 169 provides 
that indigenous peoples have the right to decide their own priorities for the 
process of development that affects them and to exercise control, to the 
extent  possible, over their own economic, social and cultural  development. 
“They shall [also] participate in the formulation, implementation and 
 evaluation of plans and programmes for national and regional development 
which may affect them directly.”
123sexies. Finally, indigenous peoples have a right to self-determination in 
terms of Article 3 UNDRIP, according to which they have the right to freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.
123septies. Pursuant to Article 29(b) of the American Convention, this Court 
may not interpret the provisions of Article 21 in a manner that restricts the 
enjoyment and exercise of the right to property to a lesser degree than what 
is recognized in the instruments cited above. Hence, in light of indigenous 
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peoples’ right to self-determination in terms of Common Article 1 ICCPR 
and ICESCR and Article 3 UNDRIP and their right to decide on their 
development in terms of Article 7(1) of ILO Convention 169, Articles 1(1), 
21, 23 and 26 of the American Convention must be interpreted in  accordance 
with the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples. Accordingly, 
the Sarayaku have the right to enjoy property in accordance with their 
 communal tradition, and to freely pursue the social, cultural and economic 
development of their choice.
VIII.2 RIGHTS TO CONSULTATION AND TO INDIGENOUS 
COMMUNAL PROPERTY
124. In this case, it must be determined whether the State adequately 
respected and guaranteed the rights of the Sarayaku People that were 
 allegedly violated, by granting a contract for oil exploration and 
 exploitation on their territory to a private company; by implementing this 
contract and by the occurrence of a series of related events. Even though 
the State acknowledged that it had failed to conduct prior  consultations 
in this case, during the litigation, it questioned its obligation to do so 
and argued that certain actions taken by the company satisfied the 
requirement to consult the indigenous communities of the area granted 
in concession. Unlike other cases heard by this Court, in this case there 
is no doubt regarding the right of the Sarayaku People to their territory, 
which has been fully acknowledged by the State in domestic proceedings 
(supra paras. 55, 61 and 62) and as an undisputed fact before the Court. 
The Court will now analyze: (a) the arguments of the parties, and (b) the 
obligation to guarantee the right to consultation, in relation to the [right] 
to communal property [fragment deleted] of the Sarayaku People.
B. The obligation to guarantee the right to consultation in relation to 
the rights to indigenous communal property and cultural identity of the 
Sarayaku People
B.1 The right to communal indigenous property
. . .
145. Article 21 of the American Convention protects the close  relationship 
between indigenous peoples and their lands, and with the natural resources 
on their ancestral territories and the intangible elements arising from 
these. . . . Ignoring the specific forms of the right to the use and enjoyment 
of property based on the culture, practices, customs and beliefs of each 
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people, would be tantamount to maintaining that there is only one way to 
use and dispose of property, which, in turn, would render protection under 
Article 21 of the Convention illusory for millions of people.
146. Given this intrinsic connection that indigenous and tribal peoples 
have with their territory, the protection of property rights and the use 
and enjoyment thereof is necessary to ensure their survival. In other 
words, the right to use and enjoy the territory would be meaningless for 
indigenous and tribal communities if that right were not connected to the 
 protection of natural resources in the territory. Therefore, the protection 
of the territories of indigenous and tribal peoples also stems from the 
need to guarantee the security and continuity of their control and use of 
natural resources, which in turn allows them to [fragment deleted] choose 
their own development path. This connection between the territory and the 
natural resources that indigenous and tribal peoples have traditionally 
used and that are necessary for their physical and cultural survival and the 
 development and continuation of their worldview must be protected under 
Article 21 of the Convention to ensure that they can [fragment deleted] 
choose their own development path, and that their distinctive cultural 
 identity, social structure, economic system, customs, beliefs and traditions 
are respected, guaranteed and protected by the States.
147. Furthermore, lack of access to their territories may prevent indigenous 
communities from using and enjoying the natural resources necessary to 
ensure their survival, through [fragment deleted] activities that form part 
of their culture; or from having access to their [fragment deleted] specific 
health systems and other socio-cultural functions, thereby exposing them 
to poor or infrahuman living conditions and to increased vulnerability 
to diseases and epidemics, and subjecting them to situations of extreme 
 vulnerability that can lead to the violation of various human rights, as 
well as causing them suffering and jeopardizing [fragment deleted] their 
particular way of life, customs and language.
B.4 Measures of protection to guarantee the right to communal property
156. The Inter-American Court has indicated that when States impose 
 limitations or restrictions on the exercise of the rights of indigenous 
peoples to the ownership of their lands, territories and natural resources, 
certain guidelines must be respected. Thus . . . “the American Convention 
and the Court’s case law provide guidelines to define the admissible 
 restrictions,” which must be established by law, necessary,  proportionate 
and aimed at achieving a legitimate objective in a democratic society 
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without denying their right to exist as a people. The Court has also 
stated that, in cases concerning natural resources on the territory of an 
indigenous  community, in addition to the above criteria, the State is must 
verify that these restrictions do not entail a denial of the survival of the 
indigenous people themselves. In light of Common Article 1 ICCPR and 
ICESCR, Article 3 UNDRIP and Article 7(1) of ILO Convention 169, any 
limitations on the rights of indigenous peoples over their lands, territories 
and resources must respect their right to choose their own development path.
157. For this reason, in the case of Saramaka v. Suriname, the Court 
established that, to ensure that the exploration or extraction of natural 
resources in ancestral territories did not entail a negation of the  survival of 
the indigenous people as such, the State must comply with the  following 
safeguards: (i) conduct an appropriate and participatory process that 
 guarantees the right to consultation of indigenous peoples and, where 
 applicable (infra), their free, prior and informed consent; (ii) conduct 
an environmental and human rights impact assessment, and (iii) as 
 appropriate, reasonably share the benefits produced by the exploitation of 
natural resources (as a form of just compensation required by Article 21 of 
the Convention), with the community itself determining and deciding who 
the beneficiaries of this compensation should be, according to its customs 
and traditions.
. . .
B.5 The State’s obligation to guarantee the right to consultation of the 
Sarayaku People and, where applicable, to obtain their free, prior and 
informed consent
159. The Court observes that, in general, the close relationship between 
the indigenous communities and their land has an essential component, 
which is their cultural identity based on their specific worldviews, which, 
as distinct social and political actors in multicultural societies, must 
receive particular recognition and respect in a democratic society. Respect 
for the right to consultation of indigenous and tribal communities and 
peoples gives effect to [fragment deleted] their right to choose their own 
development path [fragment deleted] in a pluralistic, multicultural and 
democratic society.
160. Based on all the above, one of the fundamental guarantees to ensure 
[fragment deleted] indigenous peoples’ right to choose their own development 
path in conformity with their right to self-determination under Common 
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Article 1 ICCPR and ICESCR, Article 3 UNDRIP and Article 7(1) of ILO 
Convention 169and, accordingly, their participation in decisions regarding 
measures that affect their rights and, in particular, their right to  communal 
property under Article 21 of the American Convention, is precisely the 
recognition of their right to consultation [fragment deleted] and, where 
applicable, the requirement to obtain their free, prior and informed consent.
. . .
165bis. Additionally, the Court considers that in specific circumstances the 
State has a duty not only to consult with indigenous peoples, but also to 
obtain their free, prior and informed consent according to their customs and 
traditions.
165ter. First, consent is required in cases of relocation (Article 16 ILO 
Convention 169 and Article 10 UNDRIP) and for the storage or disposal of 
hazardous materials in the lands or territories of indigenous peoples (Article 
29(2) UNDRIP).
165quater. Second, in the case of Saramaka v. Suriname, the Court 
 established that States have a duty to obtain the free, prior and informed 
consent of indigenous communities for “large-scale development or  investment 
projects that would have a major impact” within indigenous territories.110 
The degree of impact must be assessed in light of the results of the human 
rights impact assessment. Such an assessment determines the current human 
rights situation, predicts the potential impacts, both positive and negative, 
of the envisaged project on the human rights of the people  concerned – in 
particular their ability to continue to foresee in their subsistence – assesses 
the probability that such effects will occur, identifies measures to mitigate 
or prevent negative effects and to maximize positive effects, and proposes 
possible alternatives.
165quinquies. The Court believes that consent is required for  extractive 
 projects within indigenous territories given the invasive nature of such 
 projects. This is supported inter alia by the report on extractive industries 
and indigenous peoples by James Anaya, UN Special Rapporteur on the 
rights of indigenous peoples.111 Also the Committee on the Elimination of all 
110 Saramaka People v Suriname (2007) IACtHR C 172, para 134.
111 UN Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples, James Anaya, 
Extractive industries and indigenous peoples (UN Doc. A/HRC/24/41 (2013)). 
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Forms of Racial Discrimination held in its concluding observations  regarding 
Ecuador that for the exploitation of subsoil resources mere consultation is 
insufficient and that the prior informed consent of communities has to be 
sought.112
166. The obligation to consult the indigenous and tribal communities and 
peoples on any administrative or legislative measure that may affect their 
rights, as recognized under domestic and international law, which, where 
applicable, amounts to an obligation to obtain their consent, as well as the 
obligation to guarantee the rights of indigenous peoples to participate 
in decisions on matters that concern their interests, is directly related to 
the general obligation to guarantee the free and full exercise of the rights 
recognized in the Convention (Article 1(1)) and the right to participate 
in government (Article 23). The obligation to guarantee that indigenous 
peoples can effectively exercise their communal property rights and their 
right to participate in government entails the duty to organize appropriately 
the entire government apparatus, and, in general, all the organizations 
through which public power is exercised, so that they are capable of legally 
guaranteeing the free and full exercise of those rights, in conformity with 
Articles 1(1), 21 and 23 of the Convention as interpreted in light of Common 
Article 1 ICCPR and ICESCR, Article 3 UNDRIP and Article 7(1) of 
ILO Convention 169. This includes the obligation to structure their laws 
and institutions so that indigenous, autochthonous or tribal communities 
can be consulted effectively, in accordance with the relevant international 
standards. Thus, States must incorporate those standards into prior 
 consultation procedures, in order to create channels for sustained,  effective 
and reliable dialogue with the indigenous communities in consultation and 
participation processes through their representative institutions.
. . .
171. The effective protection of indigenous communal property, in the 
terms of Article 21 of the Convention in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 
of this instrument, imposes on States the positive obligation to adopt 
See also e.g. UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and 
 fundamental freedoms of indigenous people, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, Human rights 
and indigenous issues (UN Doc. E/CN.4/2003/90 (2003)) and CESCR, Concluding 
observations on the third periodic report of Ecuador (UN Doc. E/C.12/ECU/CO/3 
(2012)).
112 CERD, Concluding observations on the combined 17th to 19th periodic 
reports of Ecuador (UN Doc. CERD/C/ECU/CO/19).
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special measures to ensure that members of indigenous and tribal peoples 
enjoy the full and equal exercise of their right to the lands that they have 
 traditionally used and occupied. [fragment deleted]
172. . . . It has not been contested that the company opened seismic 
lines, established heliports, destroyed caves, and water sources and 
 subterranean rivers that provided the community’s drinking water; cut 
trees and plants of environmental, cultural and nutritional value to the 
Sarayaku, and placed powerful explosives on the surface and in the subsoil 
of the  territory (supra para. 105).
. . .
174. In this case . . . the oil concession involved seismic work over a 
 significant area of the Sarayaku territory that would substantially affect 
it, given the inherent and probable impacts of an oil project in the jungle. 
The total area that would be affected by the project on the Sarayaku ter-
ritory included primary forest, sacred sites, areas for hunting, fishing and 
food gathering, medicinal plants and trees, and places used for cultural 
rites . . .
174bis. Given the invasive nature of oil exploration and exploitation on 
the Sarayaku territory, the Court considers that merely consulting the 
 community would have been insufficient. The free, prior and informed 
consent of the Sarayaku People should have been obtained.
175. Indeed, it should be noted that the Sarayaku People always opposed 
the company’s entry into its territory . . .
176. Given that ILO Convention 169, as supported by UNDRIP, is 
 applicable with regard to the subsequent impacts and decisions resulting 
from oil projects, even when the latter had been contracted prior to its 
entry into force it is evident that, at least since May 1999 the State had the 
obligation to guarantee the right to prior consultation of the Sarayaku 
People, in relation to their right to communal property [fragment deleted], 
in order to ensure that the implementation of the said concession would 
not harm their ancestral territory, or their subsistence and survival as an 
indigenous people nor violate their right to choose their own development 
path.
B.5 Application of the right to consultation of the Sarayaku People and the 
obligation to obtain their consent in this case
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177. The Court has established that in order to ensure the effective 
 participation of the members of an indigenous community or people 
in development or investment plans within their territory, the State 
has the obligation to consult the said community in an active and 
informed manner, in accordance with its customs and traditions, within 
the  framework of continuing communication between the parties. 
Furthermore, the  consultations must be undertaken in good faith, using 
culturally- appropriate procedures and must be aimed at reaching an 
agreement. In addition, the people or community must be consulted 
in accordance with their own traditions, during the early stages of the 
development or investment plan, and not only when it is necessary to 
obtain the community’s approval, if appropriate. The State must also 
ensure that the members of the people or the community are aware of 
the potential  benefits and risks so they can decide whether to accept the 
proposed development or investment plan. Finally, the consultation must 
take into account the traditional decision-making practices of the people 
or community. Where applicable (supra), the free, prior and informed 
consent of indigenous peoples must be obtained. Failure to comply with this 
obligation, or engaging in  consultations without observing their essential 
characteristics, entails the State’s international responsibility.
177bis. Without any prejudice to the State’s obligation to consult,  non-state 
actors that execute projects that have or may have a major impact on 
 indigenous peoples’ rights have an obligation to respect the rights of the 
affected peoples. This obligation to respect imposes at least the following 
two duties.
177ter. First, these non-state actors must refuse to enter into a joint  enterprise 
with a State, when they knew or ought to have known that the State failed to 
comply with its obligation to respect indigenous rights,  including its duty to 
consult and, where applicable, to obtain the free, prior and informed consent 
of the affected community.
177quater. Second, these non-state actors must also consult with the 
affected indigenous communities prior to launching their operations. Where 
 applicable, this duty to consult amounts to a duty to obtain their consent. 
During the negotiations both the non-state actors involved and the affected 
communities must act in good faith and within the framework of the 
 consultations conducted with the State. Since the State remains  primarily 
responsible to protect the rights of indigenous peoples, it has to  regulate and 
monitor the negotiation process between non-state actors and  indigenous 
communities, and must ensure accountability on the part of all actors involved 
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for non-compliance with their respective duties and for the  commitments 
entered into.
177quinquies. Accordingly, both the State and the non-state actor, in this 
case CGC, have a common responsibility to respect indigenous rights. Their 
respective obligations are complementary and apply simultaneously. The 
State bears the primary obligation and has to ensure, within its domestic 
legal system, accountability of the non-state actor for non-compliance with 
its human rights duties. In this regard, the Court strongly denounces the 
Deed of Termination concluded between the State of Ecuador and CGC, 
which provides that no environmental liability can be attributed to the 
contractor.
178. Thus, it is necessary to determine the manner and sense in which 
the State had an obligation to guarantee the Sarayaku People’s right to 
consultation and whether the actions of the concessionaire company, 
which the State described as forms of “socialization” or attempts to 
reach an “understanding,” satisfy the minimum standards and essential 
requirements of a valid consultation process with indigenous communities 
and peoples in relation to their rights to communal property and cultural 
identity. To this end, the Court must analyze the facts, recapitulating some 
of the essential elements of the right to consultation, taking into account 
inter-American case law and norms, State practice, and the evolution of 
international law. This analysis will be made as follows: (a) the prior nature 
of the  consultation; (b) good faith and the aim of reaching an  agreement; 
(c) appropriate and accessible consultation; (d) the environmental impact 
assessment, and (e) informed consultation.
a) Consultation must be carried out in advance
. . .
183. Having established that the State was obliged to carry out a prior 
consultation process in relation to the subsequent impacts and decisions 
arising from the oil exploration contract, at least since 1998 (supra para. 
172), the State should have ensured the participation of the Sarayaku 
People and, consequently, that no actions to implement the concession 
were carried out on their territory without consulting them previously, and 
obtaining their consent.
184. Thus, it has not been contested that the State did not carry out 
any type of consultation with the Sarayaku, at any stage of the imple-
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mentation of oil exploration activities, through their institutions and 
representative bodies. In particular, the People were not consulted 
prior to, and could thus also not have agreed to, the construction of 
the heliports, the  preparation of the trails, the burial of the explosives, 
or the   destruction of areas of great significance to their culture and 
worldview.
184bis. By entering into an agreement with the State notwithstanding the 
State’s failure to comply with its duty to consult and to obtain the free, prior 
and informed consent of the Sarayaku People, CGC violated its obligation 
to respect the rights of the Sarayaku. Furthermore, CGC did not acquit its 
duty to consult and conclude an agreement with the Sarayaku either, because 
following its failure to reach “an understanding”, the company decided to 
abandon its “consultation” process and to begin its activities without the 
consent of the Sarayaku People.
b) Good faith and the aim of reaching an agreement
. . .
187. [fragment deleted] The obligations of the State and the non-state 
actor executing the project in the indigenous territories to consult the 
affected communities, and where applicable, to obtain their consent are 
 complementary and apply simultaneously. The State cannot avoid its duty 
to consult [fragment deleted] by delegating it to a private company or 
to third parties. [fragment deleted] Furthermore, in conformity with its 
 obligation to protect indigenous rights, the State has to adopt measures 
to observe, supervise, monitor or participate in the consultation process 
between the  non-state actor and the affected community so as to safe-
guard the rights of that community and, in particular, to ensure equality 
of arms.
. . .
189. During the Court delegation’s visit to the Sarayaku territory, when 
accepting its responsibility in this case, the State acknowledged that it had 
not carried out a proper prior consultation process (supra para. 23).
189bis. In addition to the lack of consultation by the State, the private 
oil company did not satisfy its obligation to consult with the Sarayaku 
either, since the “consultations” were not conducted in good faith, and the 
 “consultation” process was eventually abandoned.
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190. . . . members of Sarayaku indicated that there had been a military 
presence on Sarayaku territory during the CGC incursions and that the 
purpose of this presence was to ensure that the company could carry out 
its work, in view of their opposition. . . .
. . .
193. Thus, . . . the State supported the oil exploration activities of the 
CGC by providing security with members of its armed forces at certain 
times, which did not promote a climate of trust and mutual respect in 
order to reach a consensus between the parties.
194. In addition, the company’s actions . . . failed to respect the 
 established structures of authority and representation within and outside 
the  communities. The CGC merely offered money and different economic 
benefits . . . in order to obtain their consent to carry out activities to 
explore for and exploit the natural resources on their territory, without 
the State undertaking or monitoring a systematic and flexible process of 
participation and dialogue with them. It was also alleged, and was not 
contested by the State, that the CGC had used fraudulent procedures to 
obtain signatures of support from members of the Sarayaku Community 
(supra para. 73).
. . .
198. Thus . . . the State’s failure to conduct a serious and responsible 
 consultation, at a time of high tension in inter-community relations and 
with State authorities, encouraged, by omission, a climate of conflict, 
 division and confrontation between the indigenous communities of the 
area, in particular with the Sarayaku People . . .
199. In other words, the State did not only fail to consult with the Sarayaku 
People, but also failed to regulate and monitor the consultations between 
CGC and the community, and [fragment deleted] discouraged a climate of 
respect among the indigenous communities of the area by promoting the 
execution of an oil exploration contract. The private company subsequently 
used this situation to obtain the consent of some other communities through 
malicious means while ignoring the opposition by the Sarayaku People.
[fragment deleted]
c) Adequate and accessible consultation
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201. This Court has established in other cases that consultations with 
indigenous peoples must be undertaken using culturally appropriate 
 procedures; in other words, in keeping with their own traditions . . .
202bis. In these consultation processes, the rights of children to express 
their views on matters that affect them, their views being given due weight 
in accordance with their age and maturity (Article 12 CRC), should be 
guaranteed.
203. In this case, the Court has found it proved that the State did not conduct 
any consultations, whereas the oil company attempted to negotiate directly 
with some members of the Sarayaku People, but without  respecting their 
form of political organization. [fragment deleted] Accordingly, the Court 
considers that the actions carried out by the CGC cannot be construed as 
an appropriate and accessible consultation.
. . .
e) The consultation must be informed
208. As indicated previously, the consultation must be informed, in the 
sense that the indigenous peoples must be aware of the potential risks of the 
proposed development or investment plan, including the  environmental 
and health risks. Thus, prior consultation requires that the State receive 
and provide information, and involves constant  communication between 
the parties. The case law of the domestic courts and laws has referred 
to this aspect of the consultation. As regards the negotiations between 
 non-state actors executing projects and the affected community, the State 
must ensure that all parties involved have access to all relevant information 
in order to ensure equality of arms.
. . .
211. In conclusion, the Court has verified that the State did not conduct 
an appropriate and effective process that would guarantee the right to 
consultation of the Sarayaku People before [fragment deleted] authorizing 
the program of exploration or exploitation of resources on their territory. 
[fragment deleted] Nor did the contacts between CGC and the Sarayaku 
People prior to the company executing its activities satisfy the minimum 
requirements of a prior consultation. In short, the Sarayaku People were 
not consulted, neither by the State [fragment deleted], nor by the company 
[fragment deleted] prior to carrying out oil exploration activities, [fragment 
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deleted] including planting explosives [fragment deleted] and carrying out 
other acts adversely affecting sites of special cultural value. All this was 
acknowledged by the State and, in any case, has been verified by the Court 
from the evidence submitted.
[original paragraphs deleted]
B.6 Obligation to adopt provisions of domestic law
222. Despite the fact that . . . both the State and the non-state actor  executing 
the project were [fragment deleted] obliged to consult the Sarayaku People, 
the Court has no information that, before December 9, 2002, the State 
had detailed regulations on prior consultation that  established, inter alia, 
the moment at which the consultation should take place, its purpose, 
those who should be consulted, the phases of the  implementation of 
activities for which prior consultation was required, the formalization 
of decisions taken during the consultation or the  compensation for 
the  socio-environmental damage caused by the exploitation of natural 
resources, particularly hydrocarbons . . .
. . .
227. Based on all the above, this Court finds that the State is responsible 
for failing to comply with its obligation to adopt domestic legal measures 
established in Article 2 of the American Convention, in relation to the 
violations of the rights to consultation [fragment deleted] and property 
that have been declared.
VIII.2 Right to freedom of Movement and Residence
228. A number of situations are alleged to have occurred in which third 
parties or even State agents obstructed or impeded the transit of Sarayaku 
members along the Bobonaza river. It is clear that the State was aware of 
situations that affected the free movement of members of the Sarayaku 
People along the river. However, insufficient evidence was provided to 
examine these facts under Article 22 of the Convention.
229. Nevertheless, the fact that pentolite explosives were buried on the 
Sarayaku People’s territory has certainly entailed an unlawful restriction 
on their movement, and on their hunting and other traditional activities 
in certain sectors of their property, owing to the obvious risks to their 
life and integrity. However the effects of this situation have been, and 
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will be, examined under their right to communal property and to prior 
 consultation, as well as under the rights to life and to personal integrity 
(infra paras. 244 to 249).
VIII.3 Freedom of Thought and Expression [fragment deleted]
230. As to the arguments made by the Inter-American Commission and 
the representatives regarding the alleged violation of [Article] 13  [fragment 
deleted] of the Convention, the Court agrees with the Commission that, 
in cases such as this one, access to information is vital for  effective 
democratic monitoring of the State’s management of the activities of 
 exploration and exploitation of natural resources on the territory of 
 indigenous  communities, a matter of evident public interest. In order 
for the  consultations that are required to uphold the right of the Sarayaku 
People to communal property and, as will be discussed infra, their rights to 
cultural identity and to political participation, to be adequate, the  community 
has to have access to all relevant information. Nevertheless, the Court 
considers that, in this case, the facts have been sufficiently analyzed and 
the  violations conceptualized under the rights to communal property, 
[fragment deleted] to political participation and to cultural identity of the 
Sarayaku People, in the terms of Articles 21, 23 and 26 of the Convention, 
in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof; accordingly, it will not rule on the 
alleged violation of those provisions.
VIII.4 Political Rights
230bis. This Court has explained earlier (supra) that the State has an 
 obligation to consult indigenous peoples on any legislative or  administrative 
measure that affects their rights. For major projects (supra), the State 
must obtain the free, prior and informed consent of indigenous peoples. 
The State’s duty of consultation safeguards indigenous peoples’ right 
to  participate in  decisions that affect them, in terms of Article 23 of the 
American Convention.
230ter. The State must adopt all necessary measures to guarantee that 
 indigenous peoples are able to participate through their own institutions, 
and in accordance with their values, practices, customs and forms of 
 organization in decision-making on all matters affecting them. Such an 
 interpretation of Article 23 of the Convention ensures indigenous peoples’ 
right to decide on their own development path in accordance with their 
right to  self-determination under Common Article 1 ICCPR and ICESCR, 
Article 3 UNDRIP and Article 7(1) of ILO Convention 169.
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230quater. There is no doubt that the State failed to consult the Sarayaku 
People about the award of an oil concession that would directly impact their 
territories, their cultural identity and their way of life in general (supra). 
Accordingly, the State has violated their right to political participation by 
failing to consult the Sarayaku on a political decision that affected their 
rights and by failing to adopt the necessary measures to ensure their effective 
participation in the decision-making process.
VIII.5 Economic, social and cultural rights [Moved from earlier in the 
judgment]
[Paragraphs deleted]
230quinquies. Under the principle of non-discrimination established in Article 
1(1) of the Convention and in light of Article 26 of the Convention, which 
protects the rights implicit in the cultural standards of the Organization of 
American States, the right to cultural identity of indigenous peoples must 
be protected. Such an interpretation of the provisions of the Convention 
is mandated by Article 29(b) so as to safeguard the rights of indigenous 
peoples  protected by the Convention, by domestic law, by the Protocol 
of San Salvador, in particular Articles 3 and 14, and by other sources of 
 international law.
230sexies. In this regard, Principle 22 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development has recognized that:
  Indigenous people and their communities, as well as other local  communities, 
have a vital role in environmental management and  development because 
of their knowledge and traditional practices. States should recognize and 
duly support their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective 
 participation in the achievement of sustainable development.
230septies. Two international instruments are particularly relevant to the 
recognition of the right to cultural identity of indigenous peoples: [ILO 
Convention 169 and UNDRIP]. Various international instruments of 
UNESCO also address the right to culture and cultural identity.
230octies. For their part, both the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, in cases alleging the violation of Articles 17(2) and 17(3) 
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) and, to some extent, 
the European Court of Human Rights in cases regarding minorities, have 
referred to the right to cultural identity and the collective dimension of 
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the cultural life of native, indigenous, tribal and minority peoples and 
communities. The Court also observes that in the Endorois case the African 
Commission has held that there are few, if any, instances in which the right 
to cultural identity can be legitimately restricted.113
230novies. The Court considers that the right to cultural identity is a 
fundamental right – and one of a collective nature – of the indigenous 
communities, which should be respected in a multicultural, pluralistic and 
democratic society . . .
230decies. The right to cultural identity is an essential aspect of indigenous 
peoples’ right to self-determination under Common Article 1 ICCPR and 
ICESCR and Article 3 UNDRIP, which may not be restricted in interpreting 
Article 1(1) and 26 of the American Convention.
230undecies. In this case, it has not been contested that the company 
damaged areas of great environmental, cultural and subsistence food 
value for the Sarayaku . . .
230duodecies. The infringements upon the Sarayaku People’s right to 
culture are not limited to territorial intrusions that destroyed sacred places 
of cultural importance and places for traditional practices, the celebration of 
rites and other daily activities that form part of their cultural identity. The 
mere fact that decisions having a major impact upon their life were taken 
without any form of proper consultation has diverted attention and resources 
of community members over a prolonged period of time. They were forced 
to suspend their cultural activities so as to defend themselves. This has had 
a profound impact on the teaching of cultural traditions and rituals to the 
children, and on the transmission and perpetuation of the elders’ spiritual 
knowledge.
230terdecies. As the African Commission held in the Endorois case, the right 
to cultural identity imposes a duty upon States not only to tolerate  diversity, 
but also to protect the identity of indigenous peoples and to promote their 
cultural rights so that different cultures and ways of life can exist and 
develop in view of the challenges that they face. Through its own actions, 
including its failure to consult the Sarayaku, and by tolerating the activities 
113 Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority Rights 
Group (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v Kenya (2009) ACHPR 276/2003, 
para 118.
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of CGC, the State not only failed to protect and promote indigenous culture, 
but has interfered with their cultural practices.
230quaterdecies. The Court considers that [fragment deleted] the activi-
ties of CGC have directly interfered with the right to cultural identity 
of the Sarayaku, since there is no doubt that the intervention in and 
destruction of their cultural heritage entailed a significant lack of respect 
for their social and cultural identity, their customs, traditions, world-
view and way of life, which naturally caused great concern, sadness and 
suffering among them, and has distracted the community members from 
transmitting their culture to their children. Accordingly, the Court finds 
a violation of the Sarayaku’s right to cultural identity, as protected by 
Articles 1(1) and 26 of the Convention. Furthermore, the oil concession 
was awarded and executed without any prior nor adequate consulta-
tions by either the State or the  non-state actor notwithstanding its major 
impact upon the cultural rights of the Sarayaku People. Therefore, not 
only their right to cultural identity has been violated, but also their right 
to choose their own development path in terms of Articles 1(1) and 26 of 
the Convention, in light of Common Article 1 ICCPR and ICESCR and 
Article 3 UNDRIP.
VIII.6 Conclusion
231. On previous occasions, in cases concerning indigenous and tribal 
 communities or peoples, the Court has declared violations to the  detriment 
of the members of indigenous or tribal communities and peoples. However, 
international law on indigenous or tribal communities and peoples 
 recognizes rights to the peoples as collective subjects of international law 
and not only as members of such communities or peoples. In view of the 
fact that indigenous or tribal communities and peoples, united by their 
particular ways of life and identity, exercise some rights recognized by 
the Convention on a collective basis, the Court points out that the legal 
 considerations expressed or indicated in this Judgment should be under-
stood from that collective perspective.
232. The State, by failing to [fragment deleted] comply with its obligation 
to consult with and to obtain the consent of the Sarayaku People on the 
execution of a project that would have a direct impact on their territory 
and their cultural practices, failed to comply with its obligations, under 
the principles of international law and its own domestic law, to adopt all 
necessary measures to guarantee the participation of the Sarayaku People 
through their own institutions and mechanisms and in accordance with 
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their values, practices, customs and forms of organization, in the decisions 
made regarding matters and policies that had or could have an impact on 
their territory, their life and their cultural and social identity, affecting 
their rights to communal property, to political participation and to cultural 
identity. In particular, the State decided to grant an oil concession without 
first consulting the Sarayaku People, notwithstanding their communal 
ownership rights, their right to political participation, and their right to 
cultural identity. CGC subsequently launched its operations, again without 
adequately consulting the Sarayaku and without the State monitoring this 
process and ensuring accountability.
232bis. Consequently, the Court finds that the State is responsible for 
[fragment deleted] violating the rights of the Sarayaku People to communal 
property, to political participation and to cultural identity, recognized in 
Articles 1(1) and (2), 21, 23 and 26 of the Convention, and has accordingly 
denied them their right to choose their own development path in terms of 
the aforementioned rights under the Convention, as interpreted in light of 
Common Article 1 ICCPR and ICESCR, Article 3 UNDRIP and Article 
7(1) of ILO Convention 169. Furthermore, by entering into a Deed of 
Termination with CGC excluding any possibility to attribute environmental 
liability to this contractor, the State failed to ensure accountability of this 
actor for non-compliance with its human rights obligations.
VIII.8 RIGHTS TO LIFE, TO PERSONAL INTEGRITY AND TO 
PERSONAL LIBERTY
B. Considerations of the Court
B.1 In relation to the explosives buried on the Sarayaku territory
. . .
246. Since the provisional measures were ordered in this case, in June 
2005  . . . the Court has noted with particular concern the placement 
of over 1400 kilograms of high-powered explosives (pentolite) on the 
Sarayaku territory, considering that this “constitutes a serious risk factor 
to the life and integrity of [its] members.” Consequently, the Court ordered 
the State to remove the explosive material, a provision that is still in force 
to date and with which the State has complied partially . . . The explosive 
material was placed in the Sarayaku territory by CGC. However, the State 
is ultimately responsible for removing this material, either by demanding 
appropriate action on the part of CGC or by taking the necessary steps itself, 
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in which case the costs can be recovered from CGC in accordance with the 
polluter pays principle.
247. . . . The presence of explosives has caused evident concern to the 
Sarayaku People owing to the risk to their physical safety, and the 
 activation or detonation of these explosives is, according to the expert 
 witnesses a real and potential possibility.
248. In this case, the oil company, with the State’s acquiescence and 
protection, cleared trails and planted nearly 1400 kilograms of pentolite 
explosives in Block 23, which includes the Sarayaku territory. Therefore, 
this has resulted in a clear and proven risk . . .
248bis. Moreover, in line with evolving human rights jurisprudence, among 
others by the Indian Supreme Court, the right to life must be understood 
as including the right to live in a healthy environment. Consequently, this 
Court must not only consider the impact of the explosives on the life of the 
Sarayaku People, but also the impact of the overall exploration activities on 
the environment in which the Sarayaku live. It has not been contested that 
the company destroyed caves, and water sources and subterranean rivers 
that provided the community’s drinking water, as well as environmentally 
 valuable trees and plants (supra para. 105). Therefore, the Court concludes 
that the right of the Sarayaku to live in a healthy environment has been 
infringed upon.
248ter. In conformity with its obligation to protect indigenous rights, the 
State must ensure that CGC, which seriously jeopardized the right to life 
of the Sarayaku People by planting the explosives in their territory and 
leaving them there after the exploration activities were finished, is held to 
account.
249. Based on the foregoing reasons, the State is responsible for having 
violated the right to life, which includes the right to a healthy  environment, 
and for having put at grave risk the right to physical integrity of the 
Sarayaku People, recognized in Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the Convention, 
in relation to the obligation to guarantee the right to communal property, 
in the terms of Articles 1(1) and 21 thereof.
. . .
VIII.9 RIGHTS TO A JUDICIAL GUARANTEES [SIC] AND TO 
JUDICIAL PROTECTION
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. . .
B. Considerations of the Court
260. The Court has considered that the State has an obligation to provide 
effective judicial remedies to persons who claim to be victims of human 
rights violations (Article 25), remedies that must be substantiated in 
accordance with the rules of due process of law (Article 8(1)), all within the 
general obligation of States to guarantee the full and free exercise of the 
rights recognized by the Convention to every person under its jurisdiction 
(Article 1(1)).
. . .
264bis. Finally, the Court highlights the importance of the availability of 
effective remedies so as to ensure corporate accountability for human rights 
violations. Access to a remedy is one of the three pillars of the United Nations 
Framework on Business and Human Rights, as developed by John Ruggie 
acting as Special Rapporteur.114 This Court does not have jurisdiction over 
non-state actors, such as the private oil company that  perpetrated some 
of the human rights violations established in this judgment. Nevertheless, 
non-state actors do have human rights obligations. In its  judgment, the 
Court has found several instances at which the oil company failed to comply 
with its obligation to respect indigenous rights. By entering into a Deed of 
Termination excluding any environmental liability of the contractor, the 
State shielded CGC from accountability for failing to respect the rights of 
the Sarayaku People.
. . .
IX REPARATIONS
(Application of Article 63(1) of the American Convention)
. . .
114 UN Special Representative on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations ‘Protect, Respect and 
Remedy’ Framework (UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (2011)).
498 Integrated human rights in practice
A. Injured Party
284. Under Article 63(1) of the American Convention, the Court considers 
the injured party to be the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku, who 
suffered the violations declared in the chapter on Merits of this Judgment 
(supra paras. 231, 232, 249, 271 and 278), and are therefore considered 
beneficiaries of the reparations that it orders.
284bis. Whereas it is not for this Court to make determinations regarding 
other communities, populations or persons who are not petitioners in this 
case (supra footnote 21), the Court cannot but note that the Sarayaku 
People were not the only affected rights holders in the present case. The fact 
that neighboring communities entered into an agreement with CGC does 
not imply that their rights (for instance to be consulted by the government) 
may not have been violated by some of the same events as considered here in 
 relation to the Sarayaku People.
284ter. Article 24 of its Rules of Procedure enables the Commission “motu 
proprio, [to] initiate the processing of a petition which, in its view, meets 
the necessary requirements”. In Blake v. Guatemala, the Court interpreted 
this provision (then Article 26(2)) as referring to the possibility not only 
of filing a new petition, but also of including other victims in an existing 
 application.115 Since in the present case, the Commission did not use this 
authority  established in Article 24 which enabled it to act motu proprio on 
the basis of any available information, even without an explicit petition by 
the  communities concerned, the Court concludes that it may rule only on the 
events as they occurred in relation to the Sarayaku People. An  integrated 
approach to rights holders, however, would imply a more case-based 
approach. This would mean that the Commission would not assess the human 
rights violations caused to a certain person or group (the petitioner(s)), 
but the human rights violations caused by certain acts or omissions from 
a  holistic perspective, thus for a broader range of victims than only the 
 petitioners who submitted the complaint under consideration.
B. Measures of restitution and satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition
. . .
B.1 Restitution
115 Blake v Guatemala (1998) IACtHR C 36.
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Removal of explosives and reforestation of the affected areas
293. The Court stipulates that the State [fragment deleted] is responsible 
for the neutralization, deactivation and, as appropriate, complete removal of 
the surface pentolite, searching at least 500 meters on each side of the E16 
seismic line running through the Sarayaku territory, as proposed by the 
representatives. Either the State itself takes the necessary steps thereto, in 
which case it can recover the costs from the oil company in accordance with 
its laws, or it orders the oil company to take the necessary steps. The State 
has to monitor these operations and bears international legal  responsibility 
for any violation of the rights of the Sarayaku People, notwithstanding 
the accountability of the non-state actor performing the operations in 
 accordance with its domestic law. By all means, [the] ways and means 
used for this purpose must be chosen after a process of prior, free and 
informed consultation with the People so that it may authorize the entry 
and presence on its territory of the equipment and people required in this 
regard. Lastly, since the State has argued that a risk exists to the physical 
integrity of the people responsible for removing the explosives, it is for the 
State, in consultation with the People, to select the methods for removing 
the explosives that pose the least possible risk to the ecosystems in the 
area, consistent with the Sarayaku worldview and the safety of the team 
performing the operation, even if that team operates under the instruction 
of CGC.
294. As for the pentolite buried at a greater depth, the Court notes 
that, based on the technical appraisals that have been conducted, the 
 representatives themselves have proposed a solution to neutralize its 
danger . . . the State [fragment deleted] is responsible for: (i) [fragment 
deleted] the determination of the number of points where the pentolite is 
buried; (ii) [fragment deleted] the burial of the detonator cables so that 
they are inaccessible and the explosive can degrade naturally, and (iii) 
[fragment deleted] the appropriate marking of the burial locations  [fragment 
deleted], even planting local tree species that do not grow roots deep 
enough to cause an accidental explosion of the pentolite. In addition, the 
State [fragment deleted] is responsible for adopting the necessary measures 
to remove any machinery, structures and non-biodegradable waste that 
have remained as a result of the oil company’s activities, and reforest the 
areas that may still be affected by the opening up of trails and campsites 
for the seismic survey. These tasks must be carried out following a process 
of prior, free and informed consultation with the Sarayaku People, who 
must authorize the entry and presence on its territory of the material and 
persons required to this end.
500 Integrated human rights in practice
295. [fragment deleted] The State is responsible for the implementation of 
this measure of reparation [fragment deleted] within no more than three 
years. For the purposes of compliance, the Court decides that, within 
six months, the State and the Sarayaku People must establish by mutual 
agreement a schedule and a work plan that includes, among other aspects, 
the determination of the location of the superficial pentolite and of the 
material buried at a greater depth, as well as the specific and effective steps 
to deactivate, neutralize and, as appropriate, remove the pentolite. Within 
the same period, the parties must provide the Court with information in 
this regard. Once this information has been submitted, the State and the 
Sarayaku People must report on the measures taken to comply with the 
work plan every six months.
B.2 Guarantees of non-repetition
a) Due prior consultation
. . .
299. While it is not incumbent on the Court to rule on new oil bidding rounds 
that the State may have initiated, in the present case, the Court has deter-
mined that the State [fragment deleted] has violated the rights to communal 
property, to political participation and to cultural identity of the Sarayaku 
People, because it did not consult them and did not obtain their free, prior and 
informed consent, and because it did not regulate or monitor the negotiations 
between CGC and the Sarayaku People. The non-state actor has not complied 
either with its duty to consult and to conclude an agreement with the Sarayaku 
People in order to respect their rights. Consequently, as a guarantee of non-
repetition, the Court stipulates that, in the event that the State should seek 
to carry out activities or projects for the exploration or extraction of natural 
resources, or any type of  investment or development plans that could even-
tually have an impact on the Sarayaku territory or affect essential aspects 
of their worldview or their life and cultural  identity, the Sarayaku People 
shall be previously, adequately and  effectively  consulted by both the State 
and by the non-state actor that executes the project, in full compliance with 
the relevant  international standards. The free, prior and informed consent of 
the Sarayaku People is required for projects that may have a major impact 
on their rights. The State bears the responsibility for ensuring that non-state 
actors are accountable for their human rights obligations.
300. In this regard, the Court recalls that the processes of  participation 
and prior consultation must be conducted in good faith at all the 
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 preparation and planning stages of any project of this nature. Moreover, 
in keeping with the international standards applicable in such cases, the 
State must truly ensure that any plan or project that involves, or could 
 potentially affect the ancestral territory, includes prior comprehensive 
studies on the environmental or social impact, prepared by  independent, 
 technically qualified entities, with the active participation of the  indigenous 
 communities concerned.
b) Regulation of prior consultation in domestic law
. . .
c) Training of State officials on the rights of indigenous peoples
302. In this case, the Court has determined that the violations of the 
rights to political participation and to prior consultation, in relation 
with the Sarayaku People’s rights to communal property and to cultural 
identity, [fragment deleted] resulted from the acts and omissions of dif-
ferent  officials and institutions as well as of non-state actors, that failed 
to guarantee those rights. The State must implement, within a reason-
able time and with the corresponding budgetary allocation, mandatory 
programs or courses that include modules on the domestic and inter-
national standards concerning the human rights of indigenous peoples 
and communities, for military, police and judicial officials, as well as 
others whose functions involve relations with indigenous peoples, as 
part of the general and continuing training of officials in the respective 
institutions, at all hierarchical levels. In conformity with their obligation 
to protect indigenous rights, the State should encourage non-state actors 
that execute  projects affecting indigenous rights to participate in these 
trainings.
. . .
C. Compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage
. . .
C.2 Non-pecuniary damage
. . .
b) Considerations of the Court
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322. When declaring the violations of the rights to communal property 
and consultation, the Court took into account the serious impacts suffered 
by the People owing to their profound social and spiritual relationship 
with their territory and, in particular, the destruction of part of the forest 
and certain places of great symbolic value.
323. Bearing in mind the compensation ordered by the Court in other 
cases, and based on the circumstances of this case, the suffering caused 
to the People and to their cultural identity, the impact on their  territory, 
 particularly due to the presence of explosives, as well as the changes caused 
in their living conditions and way of life and the other  non-pecuniary 
damage they suffered owing to the violations declared in this Judgment, the 
Court finds it pertinent to establish, in equity, the sum of US$1,250,000.00 
(one million, two hundred and fifty thousand United States dollars) 
for the Sarayaku People as compensation for  non-pecuniary damage. 
This amount must be paid to the Association of Sarayaku People 
(Tayjasaruta), within one year of notification of this Judgment, so that 
the money may be invested as the People see fit, in accordance with its 
own decision-making mechanisms and institutions, among other aspects, 
for the  implementation of educational, cultural, food security, health care 
and eco-tourism  development projects or other community  infrastructure 
 projects or projects of collective interest that the People considers a 
 priority, paying specific attention to the rights and needs of children and 
young people.
. . .
X OPERATIVE PARAGRAPHS
341. Therefore,
THE COURT DECLARES:
Unanimously, that:
1. Based on the broad acknowledgment of responsibility made by the 
State, which the Court has assessed positively, the preliminary objection 
filed has no purpose and it is not appropriate to analyze it, in the terms of 
paragraph 30 of this Judgment.
2. The State is responsible for the violation of the rights to  consultation, to 
indigenous communal property, [fragment deleted] to political  participation 
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and to cultural identity, in the terms of Articles 21, 23 and 26 of the 
American Convention, in relation to Articles 1(1) and 2 thereof, to the 
detriment of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku and, accordingly, 
their right to choose their own development path . . .
3. The State is responsible for the violation of the right to life, which 
includes the right to a healthy environment, and for severely jeopardizing 
the right to personal integrity, recognized in Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the 
American Convention, in relation to the obligation to guarantee the right 
to communal property, in the terms of Articles 1(1) and 21 thereof, to the 
detriment of the members of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku 
. . .
4. The State is responsible for the violation of the right to judicial 
 guarantees and to judicial protection recognized in Articles 8(1) and 25 
of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the 
 detriment of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku . . .
5. It is not appropriate to analyze the facts of this case in light of 
[Articles 7, 13 and 22] of the American Convention, or of Article 6 of the 
 Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture . . .
AND ORDERS:
Unanimously, that:
1. This Judgment constitutes per se a form of reparation.
2. The State must ensure that [fragment deleted] all pentolite left on the 
surface and buried in the territory of the Sarayaku People is neutralized, 
deactivated and, if applicable, removed, based on a consultation process 
with the People . . . The State must also ensure that the environmental 
 degradation is fully restored.
3. The State must consult the Sarayaku People in a prior, adequate and 
effective manner, and in full compliance with the relevant international 
standards applicable, in the event that it seeks to carry out any activity 
or project for the extraction of natural resources on its territory, or any 
[fragment deleted] plan of any other type that could involve a potential 
impact on their territory . . . The State must obtain the free, prior and 
informed consent of the Sarayaku People for any project that may have a 
major impact on their rights.
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4. The State must ensure that the non-state actor that executes a project 
affecting the rights of the Sarayaku People consults with them, and obtains 
their agreement for projects that may have a major impact on their rights.
[5]. The State must adopt [the necessary] legislative, administrative or 
any other type of measures to give full effect, within a reasonable time, 
to the right to prior consultation of the indigenous and tribal peoples and 
communities and, accordingly, their right to choose their own development 
path, and to amend those that prevent its free and full exercise and, to 
this end, must ensure the participation of the communities themselves . . . 
Such measures must ensure that no project or activity can be executed or 
continued without the necessary consultations having been conducted by both 
the State and the non-state actors involved. Where applicable, the free, prior 
and informed consent of indigenous communities must be obtained. These 
measures must provide for accountability of the non-state actor in case of 
non-compliance with its human rights obligations.
[6]. The State must implement . . . mandatory training programs or 
courses that include modules on the national and international standards 
 concerning the human rights of indigenous peoples and communities, 
for military, police and judicial officials, as well as other officials whose 
functions involve relations with indigenous peoples . . . The State must 
 encourage non-state actors to participate in such training programs or 
courses.
. . .
